I. Contrasting World Views
   A. Soviet World View
      1. Russian History
         a. Russia has repeatedly been invaded
            (1) Louis Halle, in his classic *The Cold War as History*, regarded Russian history as primary and communism as incidental. (12)
            (2) Russia has no clear cut geographical boundaries, and has historically been open to repeated invasion.
               (a) The Huns in the 4th century
               (b) Bulgars, Avars, Khazars, Magyars, Pechenegs,
               (c) The Mongols (or Tartars) of Subodai (Genghis Khan’s greatest general) and the creation of the Khanate of the Golden Horde left the deepest scars.
                  i) The Mongols mercilessly slaughtered or enslaved entire cities.
                  ii) The Tartars yoke was not thrown off until 1480 but in 1571, the Crimean Tartars burned Moscow.
               (d) Lithuanians, Poles (captured Moscow in 1606), and Germans invaded from the West
                  i) Eisenstein’s great film, *Alexander Nevsky*, celebrates a historical victory over the Teutonic Knights. Its pertinence to the threat posed by Adolf Hitler is not coincidence.
               (e) Later invaders included the Swedes (burned Moscow in 1611), Napoleon (burned Moscow in 1812), and the Germans in 1914-1917 and Hitler from 1941-45.
         b. Russia survived only by a brutal militaristic rule that subordinated everything to survival itself.
         c. *Ivan the Terrible* enserfed the peasants to provide the labor necessary, and broke the power of the nobles for the same reason.
         d. *Michael Romanov* began a dynasty that fought Swedes, Poles, and Turks
         e. *Peter the Great* defeated the Swedes and began to force a turn toward the increasingly technological West.
         f. Russia became and remained a closed society, xenophobic, and aggressively expansionist in self-defense (Halle 12-19) (do unto others before they do it unto you)
      2. Marxist-Leninist Ideology
         a. Marxist dialectic materialism emphasizes
            (1) conflict
            (2) change
         b. Conflict with the capitalist states cannot be resolved
            (1) whether overt or covert, cold or hot, a state of war exists between the capitalist and socialist world.
            (2) No agreement can ever finally resolve tensions since situations and conditions always change.
c. Soviet view of post-war capitalism: “Soviet thinking proceeded on the assumption that the war had either mortally wounded capitalism or that it had given it only a temporary access of strength, and that the renewal of the struggle for markets would lead inevitably to its self-destruction.” (McCauley Origins 34)

3. War time losses
   a. Appalling is the mildest description
      (1) Post-glasnost estimates give the figure of 48,000,000 Soviet citizens (military and civilian) dead from World War II--about 25% of the total population
         (a) This is more than twice the number released to the West
         (b) Ironically, the US might have feared the Soviets a lot less had we known the extent of the damage
         (c) Stalin, of course, would have regarded an admission of the severity of his losses as an invitation to attack.
      (2) 70,000 villages, 65,000 km of railway, half of all urban dwellings destroyed (McCauley Origins 32)

B. U.S. World View
1. The US experience has been conditioned by a struggle with nature, not with Man.
   a. The Atlantic and Pacific Ocean make us virtually invulnerable to invasion, and provided a security denied European nations
   b. For the US, peace was normal, war abnormal.
      (1) The free market provided the greatest good to the greatest number of people
      (2) Democratic government compromised differences and avoid armed conflict
      (3) The U.S. had a divine mission to model and / or spread democracy to the world, thus spreading the blessings of democracy and capitalism
   c. George Washington had expressed our orientation in his Farewell Address: “The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign Nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little Political connection as possible.”
   d. James Monroe with the Monroe Doctrine had emphasized this separation: “The political system of the European powers is essentially different . . . from that of America.”
   e. The Pax Britannia allowed us to get away with this until the First World War, when, significantly, the British were weakened enough to require our help.
   f. Following the end of the war, the US refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, join the League of Nations, and turned its back on Woodrow Wilson’s dream of a universalist, democratic world government that would preserve peace. The isolationist impulse was far too strong.
      (1) The nation’s slogan became “Back to Normalcy,” which meant making money and ignoring the outside world politically
      (2) Most Revisionist historians are strongly influenced by isolationism; involvement in the world at large is immoral, demeaning, and distracts us from reforming ourselves.
   g. Neither US political leaders (Woodrow Wilson or Franklin Delano Roosevelt, for instance) nor the American public were comfortable with power politics.
      (1) Going to war to secure a sphere of influence has not been a successful
proposition for Americans. War is so evil to us, that it can be justified only by the most severe of provocations or noblest of goals:

(a) The Spanish American War to liberate the Cubans (cf the Teller Amendment)

(b) World War I: “to make the world safe for democracy” (not to prevent German domination of Europe)

(c) World War II: to destroy Nazism and Japanese imperialism, a *Crusade in Europe*, in Eisenhower’s phrase (cf The Atlantic Charter)

(d) The Gulf War: to protect democracy in Kuwait and prevent expansion of power for the Hitler-like Saddam Hussein (not to protect the free flow of oil to the world) (Halle 20-29, Spanier 4-11)

II. War Time Background

A. Stalin’s Foreign Policy in the 1930s

1. Fear of Involvement in a War with Germany

   a. **The Eighteenth Party Congress**  March 10, 1939

      (1) "Stalin spoke out clearly and unequivocally when he confirmed that at all costs he was not going to involve the USSR in war for the benefit of others. This political line was taken up by the Soviet press which said even more explicitly that the USSR was not going to be dragged into a war against Germany by the machinations of Great Britain and France." (Seaton 7) (italics added)

2. Molotov in Berlin in November 1940

   a. Molotov goes to Berlin to talk to Ribbentrop. He ignored German proposals to turn Russian attention to the Persian Gulf. He responded with "a long monologue in which he repeated the well-known Soviet aspirations in Finland, Southern Bukovina and the Dardanelles Straits. Molotov wanted German troops out of Finland, and Japan to renounce her concession rights to coal and iron in North Sakhalin. He further proposed that the Soviet Union should issue a guarantee to Bulgaria, similar to that given by Germany to Rumania, *with the additional right to set up bases capable of controlling movement through the Turkish Straits*. . . . [Later that night] Molotov revealed his secondary spheres of interest, which included Greece, Yugo-Slavia, Hungary and Poland and the control of the Baltic Sea." (Seaton 13) (emphasis added)

3. December 1941, Stalin asked Anthony Eden to recognize Soviet territorial gains which resulted from the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. (McCauley Origins 37-8)

B. Areas of Friction

1. **The Second Front**

   a. Stalin always feared that the US and Great Britain would delay a Second Front until Germany and the USSR had destroyed each other, and then would step in and pick up the pieces.

      (1) He had hoped that the same thing would occur when he signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact

   b. George Catlett Marshall had wanted an American build-up in 1942 and an invasion of France in 1943

   c. Roosevelt wanted to do something in 1942 (Stalingrad was being fought that year)
agreed to TORCH, the invasion of North Africa, at Churchill’s insistence.

d. As Marshall feared, TORCH led logically to an invasion of Sicily and then Italy in 1943.
   (1) This tied up too much shipping for OVERLORD to be launched in 1943.

e. Stalin’s (and Molotov’s) attitude during these delays became increasingly hostile
   and paranoid.
   (1) The actual difficulties of raising an army of 11,000,000, equipping it,
       transporting it to Europe while fighting in the Pacific, and then crossing
       the English Channel in the teeth of German opposition were never really
       understood by Stalin.

2. Poland
   a. **Katyn**
      (1) Stalin arrested some 14,000 Polish officers when he occupied eastern
          Poland in 1939
      (2) At least 4,000 of them were executed in the Katyn Forest and buried in a
          mass grave
          (a) Stalin denied this to his death, but there is no longer any question
              as to the facts.
      (3) The Germans discovered the bodies in 1943 and brought in the Red Cross
          to prove Soviet atrocities
          (a) nothing like a little self-serving propaganda
          (b) Stalin claimed the Germans did it
          (c) The London Polish government-in-exile accused Stalin of the
              crime.
          (d) Stalin used this as a pretext to establish his puppet Lublin
              Government as the “government” of Poland on July 2, 1944.
          (e) The issue for Stalin was really Soviet control of a post war Poland.

            i) **Any** government in Poland which represented the wishes of
               the Polish people would be adamantly anti-Soviet. Stalin
               could not permit this.
            ii) He murdered the officers in order to decapitate the ruling
                class in Poland and nip any organized resistance in the bud

   b. When the **Polish Home Army** rose in revolt (August 1, 1944) as the Red Army
      approached Warsaw, Stalin halted his offensive and sat idly while the Germans
      systematically massacred the defenders.
      (1) Stalin also blocked all efforts by the US and Britain to airlift supplies to
          the hard-pressed Poles.
      (2) The Germans were killing the anti-Soviet leadership for him.
      (3) In 1945, leaders in the Polish Home Army went to Moscow to discuss
          broadening the Provisional Government and were arrested.

   c. There was nothing that we could do about this, but these actions are bitterly
      repulsive to Western leaders. Such brutality and cynicism do not breed trust.

3. Czechoslovakia
   a. **Edouard Beneš** was pro-Soviet (the Munich Pact somehow led many Czechs to
      be less than enthusiastic about the West)
   b. December 1943, he signed a treaty with Stalin that guaranteed a coalition
government with the portfolios of interior, defense, agriculture, and propaganda and education (McCauley 41-2)

4. Hungary
   a. As the Red Army liberated Hungary, a coalition government led by the rural Smallholders’ Party was formed.
   b. Using “salami tactics,” in the phrase of Matyas Rakosi, the communists destroyed the coalition to take over.
   c. This amounts to a unilateral solution

5. Rumania
   a. The Soviets first allowed a coalition National Democratic Front
   b. By February 1945, Romanian communist violence led to the collapse of that government.
   c. Andrei Vyshinski gave King Michael 2 hours to name a new Prime Minister--Dr. Petru Groza, a Fellow Traveler.
   d. This amounts to a unilateral solution

6. Bulgaria
   a. The population was generally pro-Soviet anyway, and the Fatherland Party government was soon in communist hands as the Red Army advanced.

C. War-time Conferences

1. Tehran Conference 11-12/43
   a. Churchill accepts the Curzon line in Poland and Soviet territorial gains 1939-41

2. Churchill proposes in 10/44 “spheres of influence” in the southeastern Europe
   a. Romania USSR 90% Britain 10%
   b. Bulgaria USSR 75% Britain 25%
   c. Hungary USSR 50% Britain 50%
   d. Yugoslavia USSR 50% Britain 50%
   e. Greece USSR 10% Britain 90%
   f. Molotov asked for further revision, no agreement was made, and Roosevelt never signed off on it. (McCauley Origins 38-9, 54)

3. Yalta Conference 2/45
   a. Big Three
      (1) Franklin Delano Roosevelt--US
          (a) Chief goal is to secure Soviet declaration of war on Japan
      (2) Winston Churchill--Great Britain
      (3) Josef Stalin--USSR
   b. Agreements regarding Europe
      (1) USSR receives part of eastern Poland
      (2) Poland compensated by moving western border to the Oder.
      (3) USSR would receive largest share of the reparations from Germany
      (4) Germany to be divided into US, British, French, and Soviet zones of occupation (ZOC)
      (5) Berlin to be jointly governed by the Four Powers
      (6) Democratic interim governments were to hold free elections in the liberated states.
          (a) “democratic” and “free” proved to be enormously flexible.
   c. Agreements regarding Asia
      (1) USSR would receive Sakhalin island and the Kurile Islands, plus rights
in Manchuria (including the naval base at Port Arthur and the operation of the Manchurian Railroad): in other words, a return to the status quo ante 1905 (before the Russo-Japanese War)

(2) Outer Mongolia becomes a Soviet satellite
(3) Stalin promised to declare war on Japan between 60 and 90 days after Germany’s surrender.
   (a) Stalin kept this promise to the day.

d. A **“Declaration on Liberated Europe”** was issued
   (1) Stalin once told Anthony Eden that a declaration was “algebra” and an agreement was “practical arithmetic.” Stalin did not disparage algebra, but he preferred practical arithmetic. (McCauley 55)

e. Factors to Remember
   (1) The Battle of the Bulge left the West in a poor bargaining position
   (2) Location at Yalta gave Stalin a stronger bargaining position
   (3) FDR’s military advisers were adamant on the subject of Soviet help with Japan. FDR has to pay Stalin’s price.

4. **Truman Meets Molotov 4/23/45**
   a. Truman told Molotov that the Soviets would from henceforth have to keep their agreements [specifically, on the subject of free elections in Poland], that relations could no longer be on the basis of ‘one way street.’ Molotov replied ‘I have never been talked to like this in my life.’ Truman replied ‘Carry out your agreements and you won’t get talked to like that.’” (McCauley Origins 61)
   (1) Ambrose (59) describes Truman as more intemperate as this; Weisberger (37) less so, but makes it clear that Truman was pretty tough.
   (2) Truman had been in office only 11 days
   (3) It should be noted that the US did not immediately abandon negotiations.

5. **San Francisco Conference 4/45**
   a. United Nations
      (1) General Assembly
      (2) Security Council
         (a) 5 permanent members with veto power
      (3) International Court of Justice
         (a) Convenes in The Hague
   b. Other bodies
      (1) Secretariat--administrative body
      (2) United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA)
      (3) United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF)
      (4) United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

D. **Potsdam 7-8/45**
1. Big Three
   a. **Harry S Truman**--US
      (1) FDR had died 4/12/45
   b. **Clement Attlee**
      (1) Churchill was defeated during the conference
   c. **Josef Stalin**

2. Stalin’s shopping list
a. Decide on German reparations
b. Liquidate the London Polish government
c. Internationalization of the Ruhr
d. Soviet trusteeship over Libya
e. Rupture diplomatic relations with Spain
f. Replace the Montreux Convention on the Straits with Russian control
g. Return to the Soviet Union of land lost to Soviet Georgia and Soviet Armenia in 1921

1) While the first 3 can be tied to legitimate defense interests, the last four are fundamentally aggressive.
2) These may have been bargaining chips, but Stalin does not drop them here.

3. Agreements regarding Europe
a. Truman recognizes the Lublin government in Poland, bowing to Stalin’s fait accompli.

b. Truman refused to acknowledge the governments of Bulgaria and Romania, with James MacGregor Byrnes citing violations of the Declaration on Liberated Europe.
   1) this position was later softened and we accepted the governments in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland.

c. The US accepts changes to the Polish-German border placing it on the Oder-Neisse Line (shifted westwards)
d. Byrnes offers Stalin not only reparations from his zone of Germany, but 25% of the Western zone as well.
e. Truman regards both actions as evidence of a lack of good faith, but agrees in recognition of the Soviet sphere of influence.

4. Agreements regarding Asia
a. Korea was to be occupied by the Soviets north of the 39th parallel, and by the US south of that line.

5. Other issues were resolved by a conference of Foreign Ministers, usually in favor of Soviet demands.
a. This also leaves a bad impression on Truman.

E. The Decision to Drop the Bomb
1. This is perhaps the one subject in US history upon which I am least objective.
2. My father had received his orders to return for a second tour of combat--the first wave, tactical air support for the invasion of the Japanese Home Islands. He has never doubted for a moment that he would have died.

3. Gar Alperowitz argued in Atomic Diplomacy in 1965 that Truman dropped the bomb not to defeat Japan but to intimidate the Russians. This view has obtained wide credence.
4. I regard Alperowitz’ views as nonsense.
   a. If I get into this in detail, this will take a very long time to write and read. So I will point you to a few works instead.

5. Robert James Maddox has demonstrated in The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War how Alperowitz misuses and distorts the documentary evidence to make his case. He is in my opinion not a historian but a polemicist who is reinventing the record to conform with his political agenda.

6. The US dropped the bomb to save lives by bringing a swift end to the war.
   a. Alperowitz and others are ignorant of
      1) The Japanese government and Japanese mentality
(2) The realities of war in the Pacific
(3) The details of fighting in Okinawa
(4) The plans for the invasion of Japan, and what they entailed.
(5) The bureaucratic procedures by which the bomb was developed and authorized for use.


(1) Both accounts are sobering, and what Lincoln called the “terrible arithmetic of war” are compelling.
(2) For what it is worth, while in Germany I studied and lived with Japanese, and their view is that without the bomb, Japan would not have surrendered at all.

c. Robert James Maddox wrote *Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision Fifty Years Later* (1995) as a further rebuttal to Alperowitz and others like him, such as Barton Bernstein (in the context of the controversial Smithsonian exhibit).

d. He cites two assertions at the Smithsonian exhibition of opposition to the use of the bomb by Admiral Leahy and Gen. Eisenhower that were, in fact, false: another example of the misuse of documentary evidence to support a political agenda.

e. Maddox’ work supports Feifer and Allen and Polmar in terms of Japanese preparedness to defend their islands, determination by the radicals to immolate the nation rather than surrender, belief that they could inflict sufficient casualties on the US to force negotiated surrender, gross underestimation by Army planners of actual Japanese garrisons and defenses [my father snorts at that; the brass, he tells me, always underestimated Jap defenses!]

f. On the decision to drop the bomb, let me recommend the discussion by James West Davidson and Mark Hamilton Lytle in *After the Fact: The Art of Historical Detection*, which is a great book for the connection of Theory of Knowledge to IB History anyway.

F. The UN and nuclear weapons
      a. Proposed by US and Great Britain
   2. **Baruch Plan** 3/46
      a. Nuclear capabilities to be turned over to the UN
      b. UN given authority to inspect raw materials, production facilities
      c. The USSR, not having the capability at all, assumed we would cheat (since that is what they would do) leaving them with nothing. Molotov refused.
      d. On-site inspections and mutual assumptions that the other party would cheat remain a major road-blocks to all strategic arms talks.

III. Collapse of the War-Time Alliance
A. Soviet power in Eastern Europe—Successes and Problems
   1. Stalin, 1945, “This war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army has power to do so. It cannot be otherwise.” (Qtd. In Dunbabin 61)
   2. Restrictions of personal freedom
3. Trade treaties that restricted or prohibited trade with the West

4. Western Response to Fears of Soviet Expansion

B. Crisis on the European Periphery

1. Stalin’s pressure outside of Eastern Europe is a very important element in the Cold War

   (1) Stalin had a clear security interest in controlling East Europe. We needn’t like it to recognize it. In fact, neither FDR nor Truman actually did anything concrete to prevent unilateral Soviet action—a de facto sphere of influence was accepted.

   (2) Pressure beyond that region could not be described as defensive in nature, only offensive, or at least, reasonably interpreted as offensive. The Truman Doctrine is provoked on the periphery.

b. Turkey

   (1) Stalin demanded a revision of the *1936 Montreux Convention*, on control of the Black Sea Straits, changes in the Bulgarian frontier, annexation of Kars and Ardahan.

   (a) These were supported by fierce propaganda pressure

   (2) Turkey feared Poland’s fate: “The Soviets have gone mad, they dream of world domination. They are crossing you and Britain at many points: Bornholm, Trieste, Albania, Greece, Turkey, Iran. Where they find a weak point they exploit it.” Prime Minister Saracoglu told us in July 1945 (qtd in Dunbabin 64)

   (3) In August 1946 Stalin demanded a role in controlling the Straits

   (a) The US sent USS Missouri to Turkey

   (4) Tensions remained high, and Turkey was forced to keep its military mobilized, which they could not do indefinitely

c. Iran

   (1) Iran was a very important entry point for Lend Lease for the USSR

   (2) In 1941, the British and the Soviets jointly occupied Iran

   (3) In 1943, the US reached an agreement that all forces would be evacuated within 6 months of the end of the war.

   (4) Late in 1945, the Soviets had not left.

   (a) They created and supported a communist Tudeh Party, massed troops, and created a Kurdish and an Azerbaijani republic

   (5) The Iranian Prime Minister Quavam negotiated with both Soviets and US

   (6) Truman viewed the Soviet refusal to evacuate very seriously

   (7) Quavam agreed to a joint oil company with the Soviets, an Azerbaijani republic, and Kurdish and Azeri participation in his government.

   (8) Tudeh growth led to strikes in the southern oil fields,

   (9) Quavam dismissed the Tudeh ministers, suppressed the autonomous republics, and appealed to the US.

   (a) The joint oil company was rejected.

   (10) These decisions are essentially Iranian, not US

d. Libya

   (1) Stalin demanded trusteeship over Libya as well as bases

e. The Dodecanese

   (1) Demand for military bases in these Greek islands
f. Norway
   (1) Cession of Bear Island and bases on Spitsbergen

g. Denmark
   (1) Bases on Bornholm Island (Dunbabin 64-66)

2. The **Iron Curtain Speech**
   a. Sir Winston Churchill spoke at Fulton Missouri on March 5, 1946
   b. Four days earlier Moscow had announced that it would stay in Iran regardless of any agreements.

3. “A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied victory. Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organization intends to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive and proselytizing tendencies. . . . *From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent.* Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow . . . . Whatever conclusions may be drawn from these facts--and facts they are--this is certainly not the Liberated Europe we fought to build up. Nor is it one which contains the essentials of permanent peace. . . . From what I have seen of our Russian friends and Allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness.” (Churchill “Iron Curtain” 1-4)
   a. The speech specifically mentioned Poland, Berlin, Iran, Turkey, the expulsion of millions of Germans from eastern territory, and the establishment of Communist satellite governments

4. The **Long Telegram**—George Kennan, February 1946
   a. This document, which was actually composed before Churchill’s speech, but remained classified until 1947, when Kennan repeated much of the argument in *“The Sources of Soviet Conduct”* by *Mister X*, published in Foreign Affairs July 1947
   b. The telegram was distributed throughout the government, and helped provide an intellectual framework for future policy.
   c. “For ideology, . . . taught them [the leaders in the Kremlin] that the outside world was hostile and that it was their duty eventually to overthrow the political forces beyond their borders. . . . [A]ll internal opposition forces in Russia have consistently been portrayed as the agents of foreign forces of reaction antagonistic to Soviet power. . . . Today the major part of the structure of Soviet power is committed to the perfection of the dictatorship and to the maintenance of the concept of Russia as in a state of siege. . . [T]here can never be on Moscow’s side any sincere assumption of a community of aims between the Soviet Union and powers which are regarded as capitalism. . . . But we should not be misled by tactical maneuvers. . . . The Soviet concept of power, which permits no focal points of organization outside the Party itself, requires that the Party leadership remain in theory the sole repository of truth. For if truth were to be found elsewhere, there would be justification for its expression in organized activity. . . . The leadership is at liberty to put forward for tactical purposes any particular thesis which it finds useful to the cause at any particular moment . . . . [T]his
means that the truth is not constant but is actually created, for all intents and purposes, by the Soviet leaders themselves. . . . But we have seen that the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in a hurry. . . . Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates itself to them. The main thing is that there should always be pressure, increasing constant pressure, toward the desired goal. There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that that goal must be reached at any given time. . . . In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United State policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long term, patient, but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. [emphasis added] . . . . It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power.” (Kennan “Sources of Soviet Conduct” 107-128)

5. Greece
   a. A bitter civil war erupted between the official, right wing government and Communist guerrillas
   b. The Communists were supported by Tito
   c. Tito’s goals
      (1) Control of Trieste, which was denied him by New Zealand troops
      (2) Tito mined the Corfu channel and shot down 2 US supply planes in retaliation.
      (3) Greece had traditionally been a concern of the British (to safeguard the Suez Canal, and Britain had long denied the Eastern Med to Russia)
         (a) The British shored up the Greek government to the tune of £132,000,000

6. Truman Doctrine 1947
   a. February 1947, British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin recognized that Britain could not sustain the cost.
      (1) Fuel crisis at home
      (2) Industrial shutdowns at home
      (3) Bevin warned George C. Marshall that Britain would pull out abruptly
   b. Dean Acheson argued that a British pullout threatened the fall of the entire region to the Soviets unless the US acted.
      (1) Early version of the domino theory
      (2) Truman brought in Republican Senator Vandenberg for consultation
         (a) A wise move since Congressional approval would be needed
         (b) Truman makes the case to protect US security interests and to defend free peoples against aggression and subversion. (Dunbabin 83)
      (3) Truman asked for $400,000,000 for Greece and Turkey
"I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes."

The Truman Doctrine is often taken as the “official” beginning of the Cold War.

7. **Marshall Plan** 1948-1952
   a. Marshall left the Moscow Conference in 1947 deeply concerned by the lack of progress on Germany. “‘All the way back to Washington . . . [he] talked of the importance of finding some initiative to prevent the complete breakdown of Western Europe.’” (qtd. In Dunbabin 90)
   b. Proposed by General of the Army (now Secretary of State) George Catlett Marshall at a speech at Harvard
      1. The only general I know of who has won (and deservedly so) the Nobel Prize for Peace
      2. Marshall said that the US would assist “the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.”
   c. Ernest Bevin and French Foreign Minister Bidault called a conference in Paris in 1947, to which they invited
   d. Molotov walked out, which was a huge blunder.
      1. Poland and Czechoslovakia planned to attend
      2. This is a threat, since their participation would inevitably orient their economies toward the West
   e. Stalin makes a second blunder by ordering Western Communist parties to sabotage the Plan
      1. Zhdanov and Malenkov summoned the leaders of the Italian and French parties to Moscow for instructions. (Dunbabin 90-95)
   f. **European Recovery Plan**
      1. The US provided about $17,000,000 in aid.
      2. How that money was spent was determined largely by the Europeans themselves, in negotiation with the US
      3. Much of that money was spent in the US
      4. All European nations were invited, including Eastern block nations.
      5. The Marshall Plan was an enormous success, with most nations achieving higher production figures in 1952 than 1938

8. **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** 1949
   a. Original members were
      1. United States
      2. Great Britain
      3. Canada,
      4. France
      5. the Netherlands
      6. Belgium
      7. Luxemburg
(8) Italy
(9) Norway
(10) Iceland
(11) Portugal

b. Goal is to defend Western Europe against the Red Army
c. An attack against one member of the alliance is an attack against all
d. USSR creates the German Democratic Republic in 1949
e. The **Federal Republic of Germany** added in 1954
   (1) Followed very difficult negotiations, esp. with France, which rejected one agreement.

9. The **Warsaw Pact** 1955 The Soviet equivalent of NATO
   a. Albania
   b. Bulgaria
   c. Czechoslovakia
   d. The German Democratic Republic
   e. Hungary
   f. Poland
   g. Romania
   h. USSR

C. The **German Problem**
1. **Zones of Occupation**
   a. Soviet Zone
   b. British Zone
   c. US Zone
   d. French Zone
      (1) Soviets would not agree to this until the US took it out of our zone
   e. **Allied Control Commission** would govern the country

2. Issues of Reparations
   a. Soviet reparations were to be the sum of all industrial plant in the Soviet zone plus 25% of that in the Western zone
   b. The US insisted that Germany retain enough industry to maintain a standard of living equal to the rest of Europe
   c. The US also insisted reparations be delayed until the Germans could support themselves
      (1) this would avoid the errors of Versailles
   d. The Soviets quickly demolished the industry in their zone and also cut off food shipments to the West
      (1) This food was to be in return for 60% of the total industrial plant taken from the West
   e. Germany was supposed to be governed as a single economic unit, but the issue of reparations broke cooperation down by July 1946
   f. The US then suspended all payments to Germany until the Soviets administered Germany according to their agreements (Spanier 42-43)
   g. At about this point, Byrnes gave up hope of successfully negotiating with Molotov

3. **Bizonia** 1947
   a. Embryonic state formed of US and British zones.
      (1) French later join.
(2) Germans are given greater role in self-government
b. Bizonia is formed before the Marshall Plan proposed
c. Currency reform instituted by US military when the Soviets walk out of
negotiations for a single currency in 1948

4. The **Berlin Blockade** (1948)
a. The possibility of a revived Germany under US auspices threatened two Soviet
goals
   (1) Withdrawal of US forces and neutralization of Western Europe
   (2) creation of a subservient Germany in partnership with the USSR
b. A blockade of Berlin, which was 100 miles inside the Soviet zone, would hold the
entire population hostage.
c. In June 1948, Stalin cut off electricity and overland communications to Berlin.
   (1) Stalin did not believe Truman would fight a war over Berlin
   (2) He believed that if the US backed off of Berlin, then the confidence of all
Europeans in US promises would be irretrievably shaken.
      (a) If that happened, Western states might well re-evaluate their role in
NATO
   (3) Truman understood this perfectly.
d. The **Berlin Airlift**
   (1) Truman’s response was brilliant
      (a) He assumed that Stalin was not ready to fight for Berlin either.
      (b) Truman chose to supply 2,500,000 people entirely by air
         i) previous attempts to supply armies by air in World War II
            had ended in failure.
         ii) Berlin required 4,000 tons daily
         iii) The US and British reached 13,000 tons daily
         iv) Planes landed 24 hours a day in 3 minute intervals in all
weather
         v) Berliners were not only eating better at the end of the
blockade than at the beginning, they were eating better than
Berliners in the east.
         vi) The blockade lasted 324 days before Stalin called it off.
   (c) The Blockade is a disaster for Stalin
      i) In elections in the West sector, Berliners overwhelmingly
         endorsed their protectors.
      ii) The aftermath is a much stronger perception that protection
against the Soviet Union was needed.

5. Establishment of the German Democratic Republic 1949

D. Stalin tightens His Grip
1. Creation of the **Cominform** 1947 under the direction of **Andrei Zhdanov**
a. This event formally signaled the beginning of a new and often brutal Soviet
policy: the consolidation of the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.
This new policy entailed the transformation of five countries into Soviet satellites
under the control of Communist regimes cloned from the regime in Moscow.”
   (Zubok and Pleshakov 111)
b. Zhdanov, who lacked formal higher education, became the chief ideologist of the
Party under Stalin. He possessed “blind loyalty, spineless obedience, and
meticulous adherence to ideological dogma.” (112)
c. Zubok and Pleshakov note that ideology had a dual function in the Soviet state
(1) to suppress tensions within the society by imposing “monolithic unity”
(2) to serve within “the framework of the revolutionary-imperial paradigm . . .
[as] one more dimension of political and physical control.” 113)

d. Western writers such as Hannah Arendt, Carl Friedrichs, and George Kennan had
begun describing the Soviet Union as a “totalitarian state” and drawing
comparisons with the Nazi totalitarian state. Stalin required an ideological
legitimation for his control over the satellites.
e. Creation of the Cominform represents Stalin’s belief that the West--particularly
the Marshall Plan--threatened his security zone and that he could hold that
security zone only through draconian measures.
(1) In this connection, Tito’s support for the KKE is an example of why he
needed control. Stalin was lukewarm in his support for the Greek civil
war, since he understood that the British could not allow Greece fall under
hostile influence. (Cf Churchill’s sphere of influence deal above)
(2) Tito and Dimitrov of Bulgaria held meetings on a treaty of friendship
without telling Stalin
(3) The French and Italian Communist Parties decided to leave their coalitions
and go into opposition, also without consulting Stalin. (Zubok and
Pleshakov 125-133)

f. Zhdanov replies to the Marshall Plan
g. Zhdanov died abruptly of heart attack in August 1948. His doctors mis-diagnosed
his condition.
(1) In 1951, just before Stalin’s death, Stalin chose to use this as the excuse to
launch his “doctor’s plot” witch hunt against the “Zionists” (Zubok and
Pleshakov 136)

2. **Czechoslovakia coup d’etat 1948**
a. Soviets had won 40% of vote, control of important labor unions, and several
   cabinet members.
b. The government of Masaryk and Beneš was a coalition
c. Orchestrated strikes and demonstrations brought the coalition down and led to an
   all Communist government.
d. Neither Truman, his advisers, nor the US public are happy about this
development.

3. **Break with Josip Broz Tito in Yugoslavia (1948)**
a. Tito had established a home-grown Communist regime in Yugoslavia
b. Tito, unlike other Eastern block Communist leaders, had won power without
   Soviet assistance
   (1) Military aid during the war had come from Great Britain rather than Stalin,
       who distrusted him.
c. Tito, rather than Stalin, supported the Communist guerrillas in Greece.
   (1) Since the US saw the Communist world as monolithic, we regarded Tito
       as acting at Stalin’s behest.
d. Stalin could not tolerate an independent Communist ruler, and the result of his
   interference in internal Yugoslav affairs in 1948 led to an open break
е. The Yugoslavs could point to Stalin’s habit of disregarding national Communist
   movements from 1944-46 in favor of imperial agreements with the West (Zubok
f. Tito signed a Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953 with Greece and Turkey

4. **Unrest in East Germany 1953**
   a. The origins of the crisis were that as late as the early 1950's, Stalin was willing to trade German neutrality for reunification of Germany.
   b. This was very much against the interests of Walter Ulbricht, who would certainly be turned out of power.
   c. Ulbricht’s response was to increase the pace of industrialization in order to make East Germany too valuable to the Soviets to lose.
   d. Stalin’s death raised hopes of an improvement in conditions
   e. June 1953, demonstrators marched in Berlin, demanding that the leaders answer for their policies.
   f. The demonstrations were spontaneous and not well organized.
   g. The government had imposed new work norms, demanding an increase of 10% in productivity or else there would be a cut in wages of 33%
   h. Since the state owned the factories in question, the protest and strikes were political as well as economic.
   i. The demonstrators went on to demand a withdrawal of Soviet troops and free elections.
   j. The Soviets intervened with tanks and troops (Vadney 192-194)

5. **Poland** sees strikes and demonstrations in summer and fall of 1956
   a. Unrest in Poland (related to the unrest in Germany in 1953) led to the release of Wladislaw Gomulka from prison in 1955. Gomulka was regarded as a moderate.
   b. The crisis began with a strike of locomotive workers protesting wage cuts.
   c. Khrushchev and Molotov flew to Warsaw unannounced, while Soviet troops were put on high alert.
   d. Gomulka and the Polish Central Committee however said they would resist force with force.
   e. Gomulka however, convinced the Russians that he would preserve bureaucratic control of Poland and that Poland would remain a loyal Warsaw Pact power.
      (1) Gomulka did not wish to create a new order
      (2) Since Soviet hegemony was the crucial issue for the Russians all along, they accepted the situation.
   f. Gomulka wins home rule, an end to collectivization, and autonomy for the Catholic Church (Malia 322)
   g. Wladislaw Gomulka, who had been imprisoned as a Titoist, becomes head of the Polish Party (Vadney 194-5)

6. **Hungarian Revolt** 10/23/56
   a. Unrest in Hungary in 1953 (related to Stalin’s death and the unrest in Germany) led the Soviets to insist on the release of moderate Communist Imre Nagy
   b. The crisis in Hungary actually began before the crisis in Poland.
   c. Hundreds of thousands of Hungarians turned out for a state funeral for victims of the purges of the late 1940's.
   d. When the Polish crisis came, Hungarian students rallied to support Poland in the face of threatened Soviet military intervention.
   e. Soviet tanks moved into place, the Central Committee declared martial law, and restored Nagy to prime minister.
f. At about this time, the students became uneasy with their advanced position (they were, within this system, among the elite.) They are replaced by the workers, who become the center of resistance (in this system, they are the exploited)

g. Nagy’s appointment helped calm things a bit, but he was not in charge. The workers established Revolutionary Councils—a force independent of both the state and the Communist Party.

(1) This is a development which the Soviets cannot tolerate!

h. “On 30 October Nagy went on national radio and announced ‘the abrogation of the one-party system and the formation of a government based on the democratic co-operation among the coalition parties of 1945’. He also announced the beginning of talks with the USSR ‘about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary’.” (Vadney 199)

(1) This coalition included the communists, social democrats, peasants and farmers’ parities and the revolutionary councils.

i. The Soviets withdrew troops and sent negotiators. They also prepared a strike.

j. “Nagy served notice that he intended to withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact and declare neutrality.” (Vadney 200)

k. The Russians attacked on September 4

l. The resistance is brutally crushed.

m. Perhaps 65,000 Hungarians were killed and 175,000 driven into exile. The number of Hungarians transported to the USSR in sealed trains is unknown. 200,000 fled to the West.

n. Nagy was executed.

o. The revolt forced the USSR into making a choice between giving a genuine level of autonomy within their empire, or maintaining iron control by naked forces. Fearing a lack of absolute control, they choose naked force.

p. Students of the rise and fall of empires will see this as a fatal mistake.

q. The US by contrast provided far more scope to its allies. Most of our allies entered our orbit at their own request, and the US never exercised complete control. Many issues, when looked at closely, demonstrate European diplomats providing ideas and initiatives. By the 1990’s of course, we have helped build a power center that is at least potentially the equal of the US

7. The legitimacy of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe

a. “But in neither case [Poland and Hungary] had a genuinely viable order been created, since the survival of both regimes depended on a degree of submission to the Soviets and to the local Party that deprived them of national legitimacy. Under Stalin the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe had been fragile because it rested on a level of coercion and centralized control that could not be maintained indefinitely, as the ‘October Revolutions’ of 1956 demonstrated. After these explosions and the recognition of ‘different roads to socialism,’ the East European empire remained fragile because it now depended on the willing collaboration of the local populations; yet they accorded this only because they feared Moscow’s reprisals if they did not—a situation that could last only so long as Moscow retained the capacity to compel collaboration.” Malia 323

8. Break with Enver Hoxha and Albania (1961)

a. Hoxha expelled pro-Soviet figures in his cabinet

b. Hoxha was feeling pressure from pro-Serbian elements to be absorbed into Yugoslavia.
c. Aligned himself with Mao Zedong
   (1) Included financial and food support

d. Represents an ideological rift within the Communist bloc

E. Challenges to the Soviet System in Eastern Europe
   1. The 1960's did not bring an end to troubles within the Soviet Empire.
      a. Declining rates of economic growth in Eastern Europe led to calls for some kind of reform.
      b. The usual formula was to provide some kind of decentralization of decision making.
      c. Since low worker productivity and poor quality of products were among the significant problems facing the economy, the reformers somehow had to induce workers to work harder and/or better. In a society where jobs were guaranteed and social services were free, that was not easy. (Vadney 402)
      d. Middle level managers and academic economists supported reform, political appointees and the Party bureaucracy opposed reform, since it would either increase or decrease their authority (respectively). (402)
      e. The reformers remained committed to the primacy of the control of the Communist Party. They do not understand that the system itself is rotten and cannot be reformed.

   2. Prague Spring 1968
      a. The initiative began at the top as the result of negative growth in 1962-3
      b. In 1966, Antonin Novotny instituted some decentralization and profit accountability.
         (1) Increased emphasis was to be given to consumer goods (Vadney 403)
      d. Alexander Dubcek replaced Novotny as Party Chairman
         (1) Although seen as a reformer, Dubcek was also a loyal Party man
      e. “Action Plan” of April 1968 allowed a much greater degree of debate and discussion within the society.
         (1) A “separate road to socialism”
         (2) Slogan Socialism With a Human Face (Malia 391)
         (3) “The program thus combined an industrial NEP with a form of anarcho-syndicalism, as well as cultural pluralism.” (Malia 391)
      f. The Two Thousand Words was published in June 1968
         (1) A manifesto written by intellectuals calling for greater democratic reforms and pledging support for the government in the event of Russian intervention. (Vadney 404)
      g. Other Warsaw Pact governments viewed all this with apprehension, since Communist Party control seemed threatened.
         (1) Demonstrators in Poland called for a “Polish Dubcek” (Vadney 404)
         (2) The Warsaw Letter
            (a) Condemned the reforms in Czechoslovakia and signed by the other Warsaw Pact countries except Romania.
            (b) Romania itself is instructive. Nicolae Ceaușescu was pursuing an independent economic foreign policy, but maintained an iron grip on internal dissent. Since Party control was never in question, the Soviets tolerated his deviation on other matters. (Vadney 404, cf. also Malia 395)
(3) Dubcek replied with protestations of loyalty to the Warsaw Pact, but also asserted Czechoslovakia’s right to act without outside interference.
(4) Dubcek must act carefully however, since Warsaw Pact forces were on maneuvers in Czechoslovakia.

h. **Bratislava Declaration** of August 3 appeared to have cleared up the matter.
   (1) Dubcek welcomed as official visitors both Ceaușescu and Tito.

i. On August 20, 1968, 500,000 Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia
   (1) The Czech Communist Party ordered the army and people not to resist.

j. “In effect the Russians and their allies occupied Czechoslovakia in order to preserve the undiluted hegemony of the communist party. . . . [The end of the Czech experiment] defined the limits of national autonomy in no uncertain terms and confirmed that one-party rule, not democracy, was the test of orthodoxy’’ (Vadney 405)

k. The Soviets proclaimed the **Brezhnev Doctrine**, “whereby the Russians proclaimed that they might intervene fraternally to protect their allies from the threat of counter-revolution.” (Vadney 406)

3. **Solidarity 1980**
   a. Prague Spring did not cause the root problems to go away.
   b. “. . . the success of reform still depended upon the co-operation of the working class. Labour, not management, would have to make the greatest personal sacrifices in order to raise productivity. These might entail lower wages to achieve higher profits, which then could be used for new investment and growth. Sacrifice usually entailed sterner work norms, such as the speed-up and lower piece rates. It also might mean a reduction of state subsidies for food and other necessities. Subsidies strained the budget in most Eastern Bloc countries, but consumers had come to regard them as a right. Reducing them would have the effect of increasing prices and thus eroding the standard of living.” (Vadney 406)
   c. Shipbuilding in Gdansk (formerly Danzig) was an important source of foreign exchange, and was thus of great concern for the government.
   d. Student demonstrations broke out in Warsaw in March 1968, and were brutally repressed by Gomulka.
   e. But in 1970, Gomulka announced major price increases on food. Over half the family budget of most families already went towards food. (Vadney 407)
      (1) The result was a wave of strikes with hundreds being killed and thousands injured.
      (2) Workers’ Committees began to organize, and as they turned attention toward economic issues, they also addressed issues of the government itself. (Vadney 408)
      (3) Gomulka was replaced by Edward Gierek in December.
      (4) The tumult continued and in 1971, Gierek was forced to roll back the price increases.
         (a) “Working class action had brought down the Gomulka government and forced Gierek to make concessions, but it had not resulted in a new structure of authority.” (Vadney 408)
      (5) Malia notes that by this point, the intellectuals, the workers, the Church and 70% of the peasants had “morally defected” from the regime. (397)
   f. Relative prosperity 1970-75
      (1) Resulted from strong prices for coal, and easy credit from Western banks.
(2) Most increases in income went to increased food consumption
(3) Poland had to import food and fodder (Vadney 409)
(4) The Western recession of 1973-4 shut off the cheap loans and the cost of
debt servicing went up.
g. Austerity in 1976
(1) Gierek announced price increases (the cost of living went up 16%)
    (Vadney 409)
(2) Strikes began, and a group of dissident intellectuals formed defending the
    workers against government reprisal. “It represented precisely the kind of
    alliance of workers and other classes which the government had
    successfully prevented up to this point.” (Vadney 409)
(3) The Catholic Church also acted to defend the workers.
(4) The cost of servicing Poland’s foreign debt grew so burdensome that
    Gierek decreed a new round of price increases in 1980
h. Solidarity
    (1) Strikes began in the Gdansk shipyards and then spread.
    (2) The Church held mass at the gates of the shipyards.
    (3) Lech Walesa emerged as the spokesman for the union movement as a
        whole.
(4) The Gdansk Accords August 31, 1980
    (a) The government “recognized the workers’ right to form
        independent unions, the right to strike, better working conditions,
        no work on Saturdays, permission for the church to broadcast
        Masses on the radio, less censorship and an easing of political
        controls of other kinds.” (Vadney 411)
(5) Solidarity saw itself as a “self-limiting revolution” and demanded a
    “Finlandization” of Poland (Soviet control over the military and foreign
    policy but civil society in control over domestic affairs) (Malia 398)
i. The Soviet Reaction
    (1) The Soviets recognized the seriousness of the economic crisis, and were
        reluctant to use military force since it would certainly be bloody, not to
        mention that they already had a war on their hands in Afghanistan.
    (2) Solidarity, for its part, had a reason to cooperate with the Polish
        government now that it had achieved recognition in order to avoid Soviet
        intervention.
j. Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski became prime minister of Poland.
    (1) The economic crisis deepened in 1981
    (2) Jaruzelski agreed with Walesa to create a Front of National Accord, but
        gave only one of seven seats to Solidarity.
        (a) “The general was not about to allow an independent union to
            assume any real power . . . . Any other outcome would have been
            revolutionary, and would have threatened the leading role of the
            communist party. No doubt it also would have invited Russian
            intervention.” (Vadney 414)
        (b) But Solidarity wanted more, and called for a national day of protest
            and a vote on Jaruzelski, the communist party, free elections and
            military relations with the Soviet Union (Vadney 414)
        (c) Jaruzelski declared martial law and disbanded Solidarity.
(d) But by attacking Solidarity, Jaruzelski lost any chance of solving the underlying economic crisis.

4. Reform Communism in the Eastern Bloc is a failure.

5. “The economies of Eastern Europe, moreover, were stagnating almost as badly as the economy of the Soviet Union, and all were far behind the increasingly prosperous (West) European Community. Finally, despite the repression, the entire region was softening up, whether through regime policy in Hungary and Poland or via the reach of West German and Austrian television in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. After almost four decades of socialism, there was no longer any illusion among the local populations that the system offered them a genuine future. They knew they were simply captive nations, and the system lived essentially off the capital of fear accumulated since 1945. But with Solidarity, even this fear had begun to ebb. It was now an open question whether Moscow would have the capacity to intervene the next time an effort at Reform Communism spun out of control.” (Malia 400-1)

F. Integration of Western Europe

1. Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, in 1950, proposes an authority over all coal and steel production
   a. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) or the Schuman Plan
   b. First step toward an integrated European community with no internal tariffs
      (1) included France, Germany, Italy, the Benelux,
   c. Intertwining the French and German economies would make it very difficult for the two to wage war against each other.

2. French then proposed a European Defense Community in 1952
   a. EDC formally linked to NATO
      (1) Such a union would ensure a divided Germany, which was to France’s benefit, since a unified Germany would dominate the ECSC and EDC

3. European Economic Community (EEC) or Common Market 1953
   a. Original members were
      (1) France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg

4. European Free Trade Association
   a. Cut tariffs with each other
   b. Original members were
      (1) Great Britain,
      (2) Austria
      (3) Denmark
      (4) Norway
      (5) Portugal
      (6) Sweden
      (7) Switzerland

5. The Inner Six and the Outer Seven
   a. The EEC is the Inner Six and the EFTA is the Outer Six

6. Soviet Union created the Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) 1961
   a. One purpose was to keep the satellites interdependent upon each other

G. NSC - 68

1. March 1950
2. Recommendation of rapid US military buildup and acquisition of non-nuclear weapons
3. Conventional build up was needed to avoid having no choice but nuclear war or inaction
in case of pressure at any point around the world.

4. NSC-68 had no immediate effect. But the Korean War seemed to validate it.

IV. The Cold War Spreads to Asia

A. US Occupation and Government in Japan

B. China

1. The roots of the civil war between Jiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang and Mao Zedong’s Communists go much too far back for this handout.

2. The mid-1940s saw Mao in a much stronger position than he had been, having had time to consolidate his hold on the northeren countryside, achieved greater legitimacy in fighting the Japanese, and having received considerable captured Japanese equipment from the Soviets.

3. Jiang’s cause is a losing one.
   a. In most Chinese eyes, he had lost the “Mandate of Heaven,” that is, his right to rule
   b. His government was profoundly corrupt, deeply inefficient, and not capable of actually governing the nation.

4. The US, with a sentimental attachment to China, had tried to support China as one of the five Great Powers (a myth if ever there was one) and any Communist movement as a tool of Moscow.
   a. Stalin actually was deeply distrustful of Mao, who threatened to be an independent source of power

5. Truman attempted to foster a coalition government in China, which was simply impossible: Jiang and Mao hated each other too much, and neither was interested in the slightest in power sharing.
   a. George Catlett Marshall was sent to China to achieve this and to assess the situation. He failed to reach a compromise, and concluded that Jiang could not be saved, and the best thing to do was cut our losses.
   b. Truman was wise enough to take that advice. So far as containment is concerned, Jiang was a sieve.

6. By 1949, Mao had driven Jiang to Taiwan and controlled the entire mainland, creating the People’s Republic of China. (Halle 196-201)

C. Division of Korea

1. The Soviets invaded Korea following their declaration of war on Japan in 1945.
2. The US occupied the southern portions
3. Following the Marshall Plan, negotiations for a single government broke down and excluded observers from the west.
5. US supported a government under the leadership of Syngman Rhee, an authoritarian nationalist.

D. The Korean War

1. Kim was determined to unify Korea, and proposed forceful unification to Stalin.
2. Stalin and Mao both agreed to the venture.
   a. They thought victory could be achieved before US intervention.
3. Truman equated the invasion of Korea with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria (1931), with the Italian invasion of Ethiopia (1935-6), and Austria (1938)
   a. This view was shared by others.
   b. He determined to resist
4. The UN
a. Truman chose to work through the UN
b. The Soviets were boycotted the UN over the issue of seating the People’s Republic of China.

5. **Pusan**
   a. The initial invasion rolled over the Republic of Korean forces (ROK) and drove them to the Pusan peninsula.
   b. US army divisions provided a desperate defensive perimeter.
      (1) The US troops were poorly equipped to handle the Soviet built equipment.
      (2) Without air power, they would have been over run

6. **Inchon**
   a. MacArthur broke out of the Pusan perimeter by landing behind North Korean lines at Inchon, in a very difficult and daring operation on Sept. 15, 1950
   b. North Korean forces south of the 38th Parallel were destroyed.

7. Invasion of the North
   a. MacArthur directed to keep going after Seoul was liberated unless there was Chinese or Soviet intervention
   b. On Oct. 17, MacArthur drove towards the border with China on the Yalu

8. Chinese intervention
   a. Mao was certainly not about to allow US troops on his border.
   b. On Oct. 3, **Zhou En-lai** warned the Indian ambassador that China would intervene if UN troops crossed the 38th Parallel.
   c. MacArthur ignored intelligence that Chinese were massing in northern Korea, and launched his final drive in late November.
      (1) His dispositions were risky, with two wings of UN forces separated by mountains. The Chinese moved an army in between the UN wings and launched a powerful counterattack.
   d. US troops were driven back in a desperate retreat in appalling weather all the way south of Seoul before they could stabilize the line.
   e. The Chinese now make their own mistake, declaring the 38th Parallel to be “obliterated” and demanding the withdrawal of all foreign troops, US departure from Taiwan, and a seat in the UN for the PRC.

9. MacArthur’s dismissal
   a. MacArthur was a megalomaniac. Getting caught flat-footed by the Chinese was intolerable to his monstrous ego. He began demanding a wider war with China, including bombing the mainland, and invasion of the mainland.
      (1) this is similar behavior to that in World War II. Truman is not as forbearing as FDR
   b. Truman, supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff adamantly refused to widen the war, and ordered MacArthur to shut up.
      (1) Omar N. Bradley remarked that *it was the wrong war at the wrong time in the wrong place and with the wrong enemy.*
   c. MacArthur disobeyed direct orders, and so Truman fired him.
   d. Matthew B. Ridgeway replaced MacArthur.


11. The negotiations at **Panmunjom**
   a. A cease fire line was drawn November 1951
   b. The only issue remaining was reparation of prisoners against their will
      (1) half of all communist and two-thirds of all Chinese POWs refused to
return.

12. President Eisenhower
   a. Once elected, Eisenhower hinted that he would use nuclear weapons if
      negotiations were not progressing satisfactorily. This may have influenced events.

13. Stalin’s death
   a. The probable reason for the end of the war was Stalin’s death on March 5, 1953
   b. Cease fire was finally achieved in 1953

E. Consequences of the Korean War
   1. Cost
      a. 900,000 Chinese casualties
      b. 1.5 million North Korean casualties
      c. 1.3 South Korean (most civilian) casualties
      d. 34,000 US dead (Dunbabin 108-115)
   2. Strategic Implications
      a. A limited war
      b. Stalin made China buy its military supplies from the USSR, which helped plant
         the seeds of future division between China and the USSR
      c. South Korea is firmly within the US defensive perimeter
      d. Taiwan enters the US defensive perimeter
      e. The US signs a unilateral peace treaty with Japan, tying Japan firmly to our
         interests
      f. Steps move forward to rearm Germany
      g. Following NSC - 68, the US rears in earnest.
         (1) Stalin’s decision to allow Kim to invade the South seems a terrible
             mistake.

V. Joseph McCarthy and McCarthyism
   A. Truman authorized loyalty checks on federal employees in 1948
   B. Whittaker Chambers and Alger Hiss August 1948
      1. House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC)
      2. Chambers implication of New Dealers
         a. Suited Republican political interests since they had always regarded the New Deal
            and Communism and hand-in-glove
   C. Nuclear Espionage
      1. Arrest of Klaus Fuchs by British in 1949
      2. Implication of Harry Gold and David Greenglass in 1950
      3. Arrest of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg for espionage
         a. Convicted in 1951 and sentenced to death.
   D. McCarran Act 1950
      1. “Communism was a world wide conspiracy to create a dictatorship in the United States
         through sabotage, terrorism, and infiltration” (Weisberger 215)
         a. Required subversive organizations to register, gave immigration authorities
            virtually untrammeled authority to investigate and deport aliens, gave the
            President power to jail without trial Communists, denied federal jobs to any
            member of a Subversive Activities Control Board branded front organization, and
            required all such front organizations to stamp “Communist” on all mailings.
            (1) The bill was passed over Truman’s veto.
   E. The Hollywood Blacklist
      1. HUAC began investigating Communists in Hollywood in 1951
a. Those accused of being Communists were “blacklisted” from the entertainment business and were unable to make a living.

F. “Security risks”
   1. In 1952, federal employees were to be dismissed, not because of past indiscretions, but because they might in future disclose information—say for alcohol problems, psychological problems or homosexuality.
   2. J. Robert Oppenheimer, the inventor of the H-Bomb, was dismissed under these terms.

G. McCarthy appears on the scene
   1. 1950, Sen. Joe McCarthy claimed he had a list of 205 known Communists in the State Department
      a. He was lying, a frequent technique with him
      b. Another technique was to make so outrageous a claim that it would make headlines.
         (1) Accused Dean Acheson, a hard liner, of being the “great Red Dean” (Weisberger 123)
         (2) Attacked George C. Marshall for arguing for Soviet participation against Japan and trying to negotiate between Jiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong
         (3) Attacked the State Department for the Soviet bomb, and the Korean War, and “losing” China and Eastern Europe.
         (4) It was all part of a “‘conspiracy on a scale so immense as to dwarf any previous such venture in the history of man.’” (Weisberger 123)
      c. When Sen. Millard Tydings, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, opposed McCarthy, McCarthy attacked Tydings, and Tydings lost the next election.
         (1) Politicians began running scared, even Eisenhower, who went along with much of this.
   2. Army-McCarthy Hearings 1953
      a. McCarthy accused the Army of harboring Columnists
      b. The hearings were televised, and the nation got to see the bullying tactics, contempt for constitutional rights, lack of evidence, lack of common sense and disregard for fair play for itself.
      c. A turning point came when lawyer Joseph Welch, having just witnessed McCarthy deliberately smear a colleague, exclaimed, “Have you no sense of decency left? Have you no sense of decency?” The Senate chamber burst into spontaneous applause. (Weisberger 124)
   3. McCarthy’s censure
      a. When McCarthy accused another Senator, he was censured in 1954, and went on to die of cirrhosis of the liver in 1957.
   4. The climate of fear created by the McCarthy witch hunts paralyzed the State Department. Professional diplomats dared not tell Washington anything but what Washington wished to hear, or careers and reputations would be ruined.

VI. Stalin’s Death 1953
A. Struggle for succession
   1. Not at all well understood by Westerners
B. Georgi Malenkov and Lavrenti Beria emerged as the two strongest figures
   1. Beria’s career
      a. Joined the Cheka early, and succeeded Nikolai Yezhov as head of the NKVD in 1938 (Yezhov was executed)
b. “He personally tortured and killed in a cold-blooded manner many men and women, innocent victims of the purges. He knew no limits in abject obsequiousness toward Stalin and cruelty toward everyone else. There were only two motives that drove him--power and survival.” (Zubok and Pleshakov 142)

c. Beria is next to Stalin in importance with the murder of the Polish officers at Katyn

d. Beria had charge of the Soviet nuclear project. He was a formidable administrator

2. Malenkov’s career
   a. More of a technocrat, Malenkov was in the Orgburo, rose under Stalin’s patronage, and helped dispose of Yezhov.
   b. Following the Great Purge, Malenkov had control of cadre selection within the Communist Party.
   c. Malenkov and Beria purged the Baltic states after Stalin’s takeover in 1940,

3. Following the end of the war, the two supervised the loss of 3,500 plants, 1,115,000 pieces of equipment, and 2,000,000 jobs in East Germany. This was in addition to the millions of forced refugees and persecution of intellectuals—all of which damages the Soviet Union in the eyes of the people of Eastern Europe. (Zubok and Pleshakov 147)

4. The Politburo was not about to allow another person with Stalin’s power
   a. Malenkov became formal head of state, Beria controlled the interior, Molotov took over the foreign ministry, Zhukov returns to a defense post, and Nikita Khrushchev kept control of the central party apparatus.
   b. Fearing the U.S. would attack the USSR following Stalin’s the Politburo sought to reduce tensions.
      (1) Decision to end the Korean War
      (2) Restored relations with Yugoslavia
      (3) Beria denounced the “doctor’s plot” as a complete frame up, and ended the pogrom
      (4) one million prisoners in the gulag were amnestied.

5. Problems and tensions in the Politburo
   a. Beria and Malenkov recognized that the Soviet Union was very vulnerable to thermonuclear war—far more than the others, since they knew the details of the atomic program. Khrushchev and, especially Molotov, are still very conditioned by World War II lessons. (Khrushchev will change, Molotov never did)
   b. The German Democratic Republic: “In 1952 Stalin allowed the Communist leadership in East Berlin to start the ‘construction of socialism’—a policy that quickly led to economic collapse and a flood of refugees to the West. Walter Ulbricht, the general secretary of the SED and the actual leader of the GDR, soon was bombarding Moscow with demands for assistance to cover the deficit of goods and money. The double threat — of West German integration into NATO and the economic collapse of East Germany—was a serious consideration for the Kremlin.” (Zubok and Pleshakov 160)
      (1) Beria was prepared to sacrifice the GDR for an agreement on Germany.
      (2) Molotov was adamantly against any such concession. He holds socialism in Germany as critical to holding the entire Eastern bloc together. Beria lost the vote
      (3) East German workers’ revolt in 6/53
         (a) The result of austere economic conditions
(b) Russian armored forces were needed to restore order.
(c) Bertolt Brecht wrote his famous poem protesting the brutal suppression
(d) The sight of Soviet tanks running over civilians does not sit well with the American public.

Khrushchev and Malenkov conclude in the aftermath of this that Beria was planning to seize power and purge the others. This led to Beria’s arrest, interrogation, and execution in June 1953

6. The German Democratic Republic and Ideology
a. Khrushchev and other war veterans saw a socialist Germany as an affirmation of their suffering in World War II and the reward of their triumph. This is not the result of some careful analysis, but an emotional commitment that will last until the passing of that generation.

7. The Hydrogen Bomb
a. Malenkov announced the Soviet hydrogen bomb in August 1953
   (1) The announcement was made because of the realization that nuclear weapons cannot act as deterrents unless their existence is known.
   b. Eisenhower responded with his *Atoms for Peace* speech at the UN, proposing international cooperation on atomic energy.
   c. March 1, 1954, the US detonated a 15 megaton bomb in the Marshall islands
      (1) Nuclear war means the destruction of enormous metropolitan areas, not just cities.
   d. Malenkov seeks a reduction in tensions
      (1) War, he assents, means the destruction of civilizations.
      (2) Such a position offends Kremlin hard liners because the revolutionary-imperialist paradigm asserts that any war would result in “a crisis in the capitalist world and to the expansion of socialism. In fact, there was no place at all for this paradigm between the two alternatives, catastrophe or detente, outlined in Malenkov’s speech. Acknowledgment of new priorities stemming from the thermonuclear danger interfered with the Marxist-Leninist teachings on class struggle and violent Socialist revolutions around the world, a source of Soviet international (and domestic) legitimacy in the eyes of believers. . . . Had [Malenkov’s new thesis] been carried through to its logical end, it would have meant acceptance by the two nuclear powers of the great status quo of the new order that emerged in 1945-1953. But the rest of the Kremlin leadership and state, party, and military elites were not ready for this. . . . [I]n terms of real Soviet politics, it had been self-destructive.” (Zubok and Pleshakov 166; cf 138-169 for the entire period)
      (3) Malenkov is deposed on January 31, 1955. “The Soviet leadership, following the logic of the revolutionary-imperial paradigm, was determined to catch up in nuclear strength with its American adversary without renouncing the goals prescribed by Marxist-Leninist ideology.” (Zubok and Pleshakov 168)

C. **Nikita S. Khrushchev** begins emerging as the key Kremlin leaders, although he was never unchallenged.
   1. He seeks to abandon the most obvious trappings of an “imperial” policy, with a generous trade agreement with the People’s Republic of China, agreement on a neutral Austria, and
a visit to Tito.

2. At the same time, he orders development of an ICBM that could reach the US. **Sputnik** is a result of that program.

D. Khrushchev’s personality and career

1. He is a contradictory man, difficult to understand. Charles Bohlen believed that Khrushchev could not understand the West; (Zubok and Pleshakov 175) I am not certain but that I cannot understand him.

2. His family were illiterate peasants. He worked as a youth in the coal regions of the Donbass and joined the Red Army as a political commissar. He was a political commissar at Stalingrad during the war, and had more first hand experience of war than most Soviet leaders. He achieved effective control of the Kremlin in June 1957 and was deposed in October 1964.

3. He was a true believer in the Russian Revolution, and felt a profound sense of betrayal at Stalin’s despotism.

4. He believed that the Great Patriotic War was won by the people, not the state, and was seared by the experience of the War. His fears of militarism in the Federal Republic of Germany are deep and sincere.

5. He could and did act impulsively without careful forethought. (Zubok and Pleshakov 174-182)

6. Khrushchev felt that the West had badly treated by the US following the war.

7. He also believed that territorial expansion was deserved.

8. Was willing to pursue **“peaceful coexistence”**—the Cold War as a transitional period ushering in economic competition between the capitalist and socialist blocks (an attitude which recognizes the consequences of nuclear war) while also seeing many areas where the West was vulnerable, especially in the movement for decolonization. (Which is more the revolutionary-imperial paradigm).

9. Khrushchev regarded Dulles roll-back policy (cf below) as a threat, and the revolts in Poland and Hungary as direct consequences of that policy, and also feared Dulles’ policy of “encirclement.” (Cf below as well)

VII. Eisenhower and Dulles

A. **John Foster Dulles** is the new Secretary of State when Eisenhower takes office in 1952

1. Dulles regarded containment as immoral.

2. He pledged to liberate Europe from the yoke of Communism.

3. He also promised to do it at less cost than the Democratic defense budget.

4. Such a policy is ridiculous. But the Republicans were promising “an offensive strategy, a balanced budget, and reduction of taxes.” (Spanier 72)

5. Dulles did nothing but mouth pious platitudes when

   a. The people in East Berlin rose in revolt in June 1953
   b. The people of Hungary rose in revolt in 1956

B. **Brinksmanship**

1. A “frontier” was to be drawn around the Sino-Soviet bloc

   a. **SEATO**: Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
   b. **METO**: Middle Eastern Treaty Organization

2. Transgressions against this frontier would be punished by **massive retaliation**

3. The **Strategic Air Command (SAC)** was created to deliver this massive retaliation.

4. Advantages of massive retaliation for Dulles

   a. It was cheaper--**“more bang for the buck”**
   b. It rejected limited war
c. Eisenhower and Dulles reject the idea of fighting local ground wars.  
d. However, they are left with no alternative to aggression except nuclear war.  
(Spanier 72-74)  
5. “The expectation was that by going to the ‘brink of war,’ the United States would be able  
to deter future Koreas.” (Spanier 74) 
  
C. **Matsu** and **Quemoy**  
1. Matsu and Quemoy were Nationalist held islands about 9 miles off the mainland Chinese  
   coast.  
2. The US signed a Treaty of Mutual Defense with Nationalist China in 1954  
3. In 1958, the PRC began to shell the islands. Naval and air efforts to isolate and seize the  
   islands were also employed  
4. The US Seventh Fleet was moved in and prevented this from happening.  
5. At the same time, Dulles rejected Jiang Kai-shek’s pleas to reconquer the mainland  
   (Spanier 79-80)  
  
D. The **Suez Crisis**  
1. METO (1955) or Baghdad Pact  
   a. Britain  
   b. Turkey  
   c. Iraq  
   d. Iran  
   e. Pakistan  
2. Europe was becoming increasingly dependent upon Middle Eastern oil  
3. For the Soviet Union, the Middle East was an opportunity to outflank NATO  
4. **Israel**  
   a. The **Balfour Declaration** (1917) promised a “national home” for Jews in Palestine.  
   b. Determination to create a Jewish state increased among Jews following the  
      Holocaust.  
   c. The British cannot keep control over Jews and Arabs fighting in Palestine and  
      give up their mandate in 1947  
   d. The UN partitioned Palestine into two states, one of which was Israel  
   e. The **Arab League** refused to accept Israel’s existence and war broke out  
      (1) Egypt  
      (2) Jordan  
      (3) Syria  
      (4) Lebanon  
      (5) Saudi Arabia  
   f. Israel wins the war and achieved an armistice in 1949  
5. **Gamal Abdel Nasser** and the Arab League  
   a. Nasser had attained power in Egypt as a nationalist. He dreamed of leading a pan-  
      Arab movement, and included among his goals control of the Suez Canal and the  
      destruction of Israel.  
   b. Egypt, Jordan and Syria form a joint command against the Israelis.  
   c. The Israelis are blocked from the canal, the Gulf of Aqaba is blockaded, and the  
      Czechs in 1955 agree to provide (funnel) arms to Egypt  
   d. Nasser began to undermine the **Baghdad Pact** because Iraq had traditionally been  
      a rival for claimant to Arab leadership. Iraq was pro-British  
   e. Nasser secured an arms deal from Moscow which made him an Arab nationalists
hero, and the USSR a friend of the Arabs. This frightened Britain and Israel.

6. **The Aswan Dam**
   a. One of Nasser’s pet projects was to build a dam as Aswan to provide electricity and newly irrigated land.
   b. On July 19, 1956, the US informed the Egyptians that they would not finance the dam.
      (1) Dulles was playing a complicated and confusing game here, it seems
   c. Nasser announced in retaliation that he would nationalize the Suez Canal.

7. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden did not trust Nasser, and feared that his defiance would destroy Western standing in the entire region.
   a. The US was in a presidential campaign
   b. The Soviets were crushing the Hungarian Revolution.

8. The Israelis attack the canal on Oct. 29, 1956

9. The British and French intervene the next day.

10. The US now intervened to save Nasser, although our decision on the dam precipitated the crisis.
    a. Dulles thought to win friends by opposing Western colonialism
    b. The US forced the British, French, and Israelis to withdraw.
    c. The Soviet Union contributed a lot of threats against the West

11. The Suez Crisis led to
    a. the collapse of British power and prestige in the region
    b. Strengthening of Arab nationalism
    c. Strengthening of Egyptian-Soviet ties
    d. Allied anger at the US

E. **The Eisenhower Doctrine**

1. Following the Suez Crisis, Congress adopted the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957: “the United States considered the preservation of the independence and integrity of the Middle Eastern nations vital to American security, and that it was prepared to use armed force to assist any nation or nations ‘requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international Communism’” (Spanier 86)
   a. “Armed aggression” was to refer to internal revolt aided from the outside.

2. In 1957, the Sixth Fleet was despatched to support Jordan’s King Hussein when pro-Nasser and pro-Communist forces led a general strike against him. We also provided $10 million in aid.

3. In 1958, nationalist officer overthrew the government in Iraq, later leaving the Baghdad Pact, the lynchpin of the whole strategy.

4. Pro-Nasser elements in Jordan and Lebanon continued to make the Western situation in the region very precarious

5. Lebanon already had a civil war between Christians and Muslims.

6. Britain sent paratroopers into Jordan

7. The US sent 14,000 Marines into Lebanon

8. The Soviets threatened and blustered, but did not act.

9. This cools Arab enthusiasm for the Soviets—they will help and can be used, but the Soviet agenda was their own, not the Arabs’ (Spanier 81-89)

F. **Sputnik I 1957**

1. Shocked the US profoundly, leading to up-grading of math and science programs at schools.

2. Khrushchev announces to the world that the USSR would turn out missiles like
“sausages.”

a. Soviet rocket forces were not in fact as strong as reported. We flew U-2s over the Soviet Union often, losing 130 pilots during the decade (Zubok and Pleshakov 189).

b. Ironically, John F. Kennedy castigated Eisenhower for the alleged “missile gap” in the 1960 election, when such a gap did not exist.

c. Khrushchev, like Eisenhower, sought more bang for the buck, and announced he would reduce the Soviet army by 33% in 1960. This was a cost saving measure which did nothing to endear him to the military establishment.

3. Begins the Race for Space
4. Explorer I in 191958
5. Russians hit the moon and photograph the dark side of the moon in 1959
6. Yuri Gagarin in 1981 the first to orbit the earth
7. Alan B. Shepard and Gus Grissom followed in sub-orbital flights
8. Gherman Titov orbited 17 times in 1961,
9. John Glenn’s three orbit flight followed in 1962
10. President John F. Kennedy challenged the US to put a man on the moon in a decade.
11. John Carpenter followed Glenn 3 months later

G. Allen Dulles. The CIA and Covert coups d’état
1. Guatemala 1951
   a. President Jacob Arbenz Guzman was viewed as a threat.
   b. Arbenz was really a land reformer angry at the exploitation of Guatemala by US owned companies, like United Fruit.
   c. Among his supporters were the Guatemalan Communists.
   d. Dulles set up Col. Carlos Castillo Armas in Honduras to invade Guatemala and topple Arbenz.
   e. The invasion went poorly, so Dulles arranged for some US surplus bombers to drop a few bombs on Guatemala City.
   f. Arbenz fled.
2. Iran 1953
   a. Allen Dulles believed that Premier Mohammed Mossadegh was favoring the Tudeh Party
   b. Mossadegh had nationalized the oil fields.
   c. Dulles sent Teddy Roosevelt’s grandson and Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf’s father (ironic, isn’t it) to spend money and foment demonstrations. These toppled Mossadegh.
   d. The young Shah Reza Pahlavi provided satisfactory oil deals. (Ambrose 148-149)
   e. These two operations help explain how the Bay of Pigs fiasco could happen.

H. The Second Berlin Crisis 1958-61
1. There was no official treaty recognizing the partition of Germany or the German Democratic Republic.
   a. The Federal Republic of Germany was adamant on this point. Reunification remained a goal of most Germans.
2. One is not certain why Khrushchev chose to provoke the crisis
   a. Frankly, I find a lot of his decisions to be opaque.
   b. Zubok and Pleshakov point to the debates over building socialism in the GDR and to Khrushchev’s belief that the issue of Germany was the main issue preventing a “long truce” and the eventual victory of socialism by economic competition. (194)
3. The flow of refugees from the East to West Germany was very heavy and may indeed have been so bad as to destabilize the East German regime.
   a. It appears clear that Khrushchev and the East Germans both firmly believed that the stability of the regime was indeed at stake.

4. November 1958, Khrushchev announced that if an “appropriate” agreement in the status of West Berlin in 6 months, the USSR would sign a separate treaty with the GDR that would leave the access routes to Berlin in the hands of the GDR, a sovereign state. The East Germans could be expected to be much tougher on all transportation into Berlin (I can attest to that personally) and at best, the US would have to negotiate with the GDR as a sovereign nation.
   a. Khrushchev is motivated in part by criticisms from Mao Zedong, who now regards himself as the leader of world socialism, and who considers Khrushchev to be soft on capitalism.

5. Khrushchev wanted either withdrawal of US troops from Berlin or the addition of Soviet troops to the Western garrison.
   a. Setting a time limit created fears that Khrushchev had some aggressive action up his sleeve.

6. Negotiations in 1959 broke down. The US was very worried, but Eisenhower remained firm.
   a. Khrushchev’s visit to Washington DC brought no concrete results other than that Khrushchev withdrew his time deadline. Khrushchev left Washington for Beijing, which, it turned out, insulted Mao and the CCP leadership. The Sino-Soviet rift is brewing.

I. The U-2 Affair 1960
1. In the context of fears of Soviet nuclear buildup and a need for intelligence, with all negotiations for some form of arms control going nowhere, the US ordered overflights of Soviet territory by U-2 spy planes
3. Eisenhower, told that Powers could not have survived, issued a categorical denial that any such flights took place.
4. Khrushchev then produced Powers in a show trial, embarrassing Eisenhower, and broke up the conference. The issue of Berlin is left open.

J. Khrushchev and the Third World
1. Shrewdly, Khrushchev used his support for wars of national liberation in the Third World to cause major headaches for the US.
   a. Supported Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana
   b. Supported Patrice Lumumba of the Congo.
   c. In 1960, Khrushchev embraced Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, visiting Castro in Harlem on Castro’s visit to the US
      (1) (Khrushchev was addressing the UN. While there, he heckled a speaker by taking off his shoe and banging it on the desk shouting “We will bury you!”)
      (2) This emotional commitment to Castro and the Cuban Revolution is very real, and an example of revolutionary romanticism. Castro reminded him of his youth.
1. **Flexible Response**
   a. Massive retaliation locked the US into an “all or nothing” policy which Kennedy regarded as foolish. In point of fact, US military response capability had seriously deteriorated. Kennedy wished to build up conventional forces.
   b. Even nuclear capability was confused. One of my university professors was part of MacNamara’s Whiz Kids. He told me that MacNamara asked for a count of all our nuclear bombs. He was told that they did not know. There were a lot of them, but no one knew precisely how many. MacNamara ordered them to count our nuclear warheads.

2. The **Missile Gap**
   a. The development of sputnik led to the perception of a “missile gap” between the US and USSR. Khrushchev may have been counting on this perception in some of his adventures.
      (1) The idea was that the Soviet Union had more nuclear warheads on more missiles than the US had. The US is therefore vulnerable.
   b. The Missile Gap was used frequently by Kennedy in his 1960 campaign against Richard M. Nixon.

3. There was no missile gap. Robert MacNamara found out that we had about 6,000 nuclear warheads to 300 (Beschloss 65)

B. The **Vienna Summit** 1961
1. Khrushchev has the opportunity to size Kennedy up. He is not impressed.
2. Khrushchev puts more pressure on over Berlin and JFK’s position is weakened by the fiasco at the **Bay of Pigs**.
3. Khrushchev demanded a peace treaty on Germany acceptable to himself or he would turn access over to the East Germans, which would effectively block access to West Berlin. He added that the Warsaw Pact would defend the East Germans
4. Kennedy said that Khrushchev could do what he wanted to East Germany but Kennedy would not accept interference with access to West Berlin.
5. Khrushchev: “I want peace, but if you want war, then that is your problem.
6. Kennedy: “If that is true, then it is going to be a cold winter.”

C. The **Berlin Wall**
1. August 1961 the East Germans began stringing barbed wire across the heart of Berlin and constructing the obscene Berlin Wall
2. September 1961, Khrushchev resumed nuclear tests in the atmosphere after a 3 year break
3. August 1961, US and Soviet tanks face off at **Checkpoint Charlie** in a tense situation
4. Khrushchev renews his diplomatic pressure in September 1963
   a. Kennedy asked for authority to mobilize 150,000 reserves.
5. Khrushchev delays further discussions until after the congressional elections
6. He then planned to address the UN.
   a. By that time, he expected to put nuclear missiles in place in Cuba, and presumably he intended to announce the changed balance of power then.
7. In other words, the Cuban Missile Crisis should be seen in a broader context (Dunbabin 210-222)

D. Castro and the **Bay of Pigs**
1. I am not going to try to discuss the intricacies of US-Cuban relations here!!!!
2. The dictatorial regime of **Fulgencio Batista** collapsed on January 1, 1959
3. **Fidel Castro** seizes power in Cuba
   a. “Historians are still divided as to when and why Castro became communist. The
usual view is that, during his rebellion against Batista, he had had no distinctive views on government beyond a general liberal nationalism. Between January 1959 and early 1961 he decided, probably stages, that, in the face of internal opposition and US economic pressure, he could best conduct his revolution by taking over, and then working through, the Communist Party. From December 1961 onwards, however, Castro was to proclaim that he had always been at least loosely Marxist-Leninist, but had disguised these views in order to seize power. . . . [B]y November 1959 Castro’s domestic nationalizations, stridently anti-USA tone at the United Nations, and subversion elsewhere in Latin America had alarmed Washington. In March 1960 Eisenhower approved the creation of ‘a paramilitary force outside of Cuba for future guerrilla action’ ” (Dunbabin 226)

(1) I grew up in Miami, and remember the Cuban Missile Crisis distinctly. I have taught in Miami for 23 years now. I am definitely hostile to Castro.

(2) In general, I would agree with this assessment. Castro sees himself as a revolutionary above all else, and his hatred for the US is the strongest emotion he has. He could not re-structure Cuba to his liking without, he assumed, a hostile US, so the obvious thing to do would be to turn to the Soviets

4. The **Bay of Pigs**

a. Kennedy inherited the plan for the Bay of Pigs, but accepted it.
b. The CIA planned the venture, keeping it secret from competent military planners.
   (1) It is difficult for me to express just how incompetent this plan was.
   (2) The guerrillas were supposed to slip into the mountains and fight Castro, waiting for a general uprising.
   (3) There are no mountains at the Bay of Pigs. . . . .
   (4) The mania for secrecy was a farce.
      (a) The invasion was planned from a Coral Gables office just above the family business of my high school valedictorian. Let me assure you that every one in downtown Coral Gables was well aware of the plan—in detail.
c. April 1961, the Cubans land. Air support botched the job, then Kennedy refused to authorize a second strike.
d. The CIA bungled it beyond belief
e. Kennedy bungled it as well.
f. Castro’s response was swift and decisive, capturing the entire force
g. The Bay of Pigs is a very important event in legitimating Castro’s rule.
h. The fiasco helps convince Khrushchev that Kennedy can be pushed around.

IX. The **Cuban Missile Crisis**

A. The closest the world has ever come to nuclear conflagration, and the apex of the Cold War

B. Traditional Interpretation: (summarized by John Lewis Gaddis) “So surely we know what happened. Was it not Nikita Khrushchev’s contempt for John F. Kennedy’s weakness—revealed at the Bay of Pigs, the Vienna summit, and the Berlin Wall—that led him to place medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba? Was he not seeking, through this bold stroke, to redress a strategic balance upset by Washington’s belated acknowledgment that there was no missile gap? Did not Kennedy’s courageously hawkish but coolly crafted response thwart this scheme, producing a triumph for the Americans and abject humiliation for the Russians? Did not both sides conclude from the experience that neither should ever again run such risks? Historians still answer ‘yes’ to that last question, -- but only to that one.” (Gaddis 260)
C. Gaddis sums up current knowledge by arguing that the Missile Crisis may have been even more important than previously thought, that this is the only time after World War II when all areas of US-Soviet competition intersected—the arms race, ideological aspirations, Third World competition, relations with allies, domestic concerns from foreign policy, and the personalities of leaders, and which led to the “long peace” afterwards where leaders on both sides found less reason to alter the balance until the very collapse of the Soviet Union itself. (261)

D. Khrushchev’s motivation
1. There is a general sense of anxiety at deteriorating position in the Cold War. The West is winning.
   a. Kennan had identified Western Europe and Japan as the key centers, and by 1961, both are firmly in the capitalist camp.
   b. The Soviet economy is not performing well either.
      (1) Austere conditions had led to domestic unrest, and Khrushchev had ordered the Army to fire on strikers at Novocherkassk.
   c. The NATO alliance system was solid; the Warsaw Pact was held together only through coercion and the alliance with China had collapsed.
   d. The US - Soviet ratio in strategic weapons was 17:1 (Gaddis 261-2)
2. Both Khrushchev and Castro expected a US invasion of Cuba in the wake of the Bay of Pigs.
   a. Kennedy had authorized sabotage and assassination attempts
   b. Military maneuvers in the Caribbean were quite threatening.
   c. Khrushchev’s commitment to the Cuban Revolution, as mentioned above, was real, personal, emotional and romantic.
      (1) Mikoyan assured Castro the suppression of the Cuban Revolution “would be an incredible blow which would change the correlation of forces between the two systems . . . . We were and are considering to be our duty, a duty of communists, to do everything necessary to defend the Cuban revolution, to frustrate the imperialist plans” (Gaddis 263; Zubok and Pleshakov agree, 258-261)

E. Sending Missiles
1. The US had placed Thor and Jupiter medium range-ballistic missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) in Britain, Italy, and Turkey.
   a. These missiles were more a reassurance of US support than militarily valuable. Kennedy apparently forgot that we had them in Turkey. (Gaddis 264)
2. Khrushchev was extremely upset by the missiles on his periphery. The idea of nuclear encirclement was quite disturbing to him.
3. Khrushchev seems to have seen placing IRBMs in Cuba as a kind of poetic justice as well as a means of protecting the Cuban Revolution.
4. This is not a rational decision.
   a. Any Soviet presence in Cuba would be provocative—we would be unhappy whatever he did
   b. The presence of Soviet conventional troops could protect Castro just as well, serving as a “trip wire” in the same way that US troops in West Berlin served as trip wires.
   c. The presence of a nuclear missile, capable of hitting major US cities in minutes, however, was not something any President could tolerate.

F. Castro’s Agreement to missiles
1. Castro also responds in a romantic revolutionary manner
a. Castro was not afraid of fighting off an invasion (which tells me that he was irrational)

b. Castro saw an opportunity to help world wide socialism by upsetting the strategic balance.

2. The irony, as Gaddis points out, is that Khrushchev’s main reason was to protect Castro, and Castro’s prime motive was to assist Khrushchev. Neither man considered the US response very carefully.

G. Secret Deployment

1. The Soviets deploy 42,000 men, MRBM, IRBM, Il-28 medium bombers, MIG 21 interceptors, battlefield missiles, (including Tactical Nuclear Weapons, or TACs) antiaircraft batteries and support facilities into Cuba.

   a. The MRBM and IRBM were not to be fired without direct authorization from Nikita Khrushchev personally.

   b. The commander was authorized to use the TACs in order to prevent the strategic missiles from falling into US hands, i.e. In the event of a US invasion.

      (1) The assumption was that the use of a TAC in Cuba would not lead to massive retaliation against the Soviet Union.

      (2) There developed a theory called the “escalation ladder” about this during the Cold War, but no one really wanted to try it out.

      (3) Herman Kahn is the theorist of the "escalation ladder" and "escalation dominance"

      (4) One approach at escalation is to dominate at one level of escalation and force the other side to take the dangerous next step up the ladder: escalation dominance

      (5) The other approach is to regard escalation of any kind as very uncertain, and that things can easily get out of hand

      (6) Thomas Schelling analyzes the problem pessimistically: "In practice, the critical threshold was likely to be the nuclear threshold." (Peret 765)

      (7) War is violent, and the violence can develop its own momentum

      (8) Robert MacNamara originally supported flexible response and escalation dominance, but in the aftermath of Berlin and the Cuban Missile crisis, became wary of the idea that there are mutually recognizable thresholds above the nuclear one.

      (9) What disturbed Europeans: "The more Americans talked about the need to avoid 'going nuclear' the more the Europeans suspected that the guarantee was in the process of being removed . . . . To Europeans, all war and not just nuclear war had to be deterred, and deterrence required at least some prospect of a resort to nuclear weapons." (770)

   c. There were a total of 158 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba at the time of the crisis.

2. The US detected the movement of course, but did not realize the scope or the nature of the weapons.

3. Khrushchev chose to move secretly, behind loud assurances that 'no missile capable of reaching the United States will be placed in Cuba’ “ (Dunbabin 228)

4. Khrushchev planned to announce the missiles after the mid-term US elections in November. (Zubok and Pleshakov 265)

5. The lies were official and unofficial, and at the top level.
IB HL World History
Cold War Outline

a. Kennedy and Khrushchev sued KGB agent Georgi Bolshakov as a conduit for very sensitive messages.
b. Andrei Gromyko lied to Kennedy’s face on Oct. 18, when Kennedy knew the truth. (Gaddis 267)

H. Discovery
a. October 16, a U-2 flight presented Kennedy with clear evidence of Soviet intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba.

2. Kennedy’s response.
a. Gaddis argues that Khrushchev, out of ignorance of democracy, failed to understand the political implications of the missiles in Cuba. While Khrushchev could ignore missiles in Turkey, since no one was allowed to question his decisions, he did not understand how this move would undermine Kennedy’s leadership. The Soviet penchant for secrecy led him to withhold information from men who could have told him, such as Ambassador to the US Anatoly Dobrynin, who first learned of the missiles from Secretary of State Dean Rusk. (Gaddis 266-269)
b. Kennedy consulted with his advisers, formed into a committee called ExComm
(1) JFK secretly taped the meetings, so we now know exactly what was said
c. Kennedy rejected an immediate invasion, which would have been the easy decision.
d. He put SAC on high alert (Defcon 2)
   (1) “We now know” that some of our ICBMs were hot-wired, without normal safety devices. One could have gone off by accident.
   (2) SAC commanders had authority to fire their missiles in the face of incontrovertible evidence of Soviet attack; to many SAC commanders, a large hydrogen bomb detonation on US soil might have appeared to be pretty incontrovertible.
e. He readied an eventual invasion
f. He addressed the American people on Oct. 22
g. He ordered a blockade disguised as a “quarantine” of Cuba.

3. The Soviets blink
a. Khrushchev’s military was not in fact strong enough to challenge the US in our own back yard.
b. Khrushchev rescinds his order to the Soviet commander authorizing the use of TACs on October 22. This is strengthened to a denial of the use of any nuclear weapon without explicit approval from Moscow on October 26.
c. Oct. 26, Khrushchev offered to withdraw the missiles on the promise that the US would not invade Cuba.
   (1) That night a U-2 was shot down over Cuba, killing the pilot.
   (a) Shooting down the U-2 was not authorized, and shook Khrushchev’s belief that he controlled events.
d. The same night, October 26, Castro cabled Khrushchev urging him, if the US “actually carry out the brutal act of invading Cuba in violation of international law and morality, that would be the moment to eliminate such danger forever through an act of clear and legitimate defense, however harsh and terrible the solution should be, for there is no other.”
e. Khrushchev’s replied that this was tantamount to urging him to launch a first strike against the US, and start a thermonuclear war. “Dear Comrade Fidel
Castro, I consider this proposal of yours incorrect, although I understand your motivation. . . . There’s no doubt that the Cuban people would have fought courageously or that they would have died heroically. But we are not struggling against imperialism in order to die. . . . “ (qtd in Gaddis 277)

g. Kennedy officially replied to the first but not to the second.
h. Robert Kennedy told the Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin that if the USSR did not remove the missiles, we would do it and that although missiles in Turkey would not be formally linked to any agreement, they would be removed soon in due course anyway.
i. Khrushchev refused Castro’s suggestion of a pre-emptive nuclear strike (Castro must have been insane) and he knew US invasion would be met with tactical nukes. He agrees.

j. The crisis is resolved on Oct. 28 (Dunbabin 227-230)


XI. The Sino-Soviet Rift

A. Early Relationship between Mao Zedong and Stalin
1. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded in 1921
2. The Comintern directed the CCP to an alliance with the Guomintang (KMT) in order to manipulate the KMT
3. In 1927, the KMT turned on the CCP in Shanghai, massacring many.
4. Soviet advice further proved disastrous into the 1930’s,
a. During this time, Mao’s attempts to establish a rural resistance was rejected. Soviet advisers insisted upon a model with the leadership of the working class, not based on the peasants.
5. Defeats of the CCP led to the Long March in 1934, with Mao’s emergence clearly as the leader.
6. In the aftermath of World War II, Stalin did not encourage Mao to topple the KMT.
a. Stalin’s price for Soviet entry into the war with Japan was a reversal of Russian losses in the Russo-Japanese War.
b. This included Outer Mongolia, the recovery of Port Arthur, control of the Manchurian RR
c. Having obtained all this with the acquiescence of the KMT, Stalin was not eager to have to deal with Mao, who owed little to Stalin and who might re-open those issues.
7. However, Stalin could not completely ignore a fellow Communist. The Red Army turned over large stocks of weapons captured from the Japanese to the CCP, and provided substantial logistic support for its campaigns in 1948

B. Mao and Stalin
1. Mao had won his victory largely on his own, and while he needed assistance, he was unwilling to accept Soviet domination (Vadney 164)
2. Once victory was achieved, Mao faced both domestic and foreign problems
a. In foreign policy, he still faced Taiwan as a KMT holdout, and he feared US intervention to restore the KMT to power
b. Domestically, his country had been ravaged by war and he needed to reconstruct.
a. Mao had to accept the “independence” of Outer Mongolia, accept Soviet model
“joint stock” companies in Sinkiang (a model which favored Soviet interests) and cemented a trade agreement.

b. The Soviets sent fighters to help defend Chinese airspace and the implicit understanding was that the USSR would defend China against US attack.

4. Effect of the Korean War
   a. Mao needed Soviet support even more (Tensions with the US rose sharply)
      (1) The US moved the 7th fleet in the Straits of Taiwan, effectively guaranteeing Taiwanese independence
   b. The approach of UN forces towards the Yalu led to Chinese intervention in the war.
   c. Heavy losses meant the need for Soviet aid to refurbish the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Spence 554)

5. Mao was anxious to obtain the atomic bomb for himself and thus avoid over-dependance on Russia. (Spence 554)

C. Internal Chinese Factors
   1. By the early 1950's, two groups had developed within the CCP
      a. Maoists
      b. Modernizers, led by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaopeng
         (1) The Modernizers favored policies that looked more like the Soviet model
      c. Contrary to Western belief, Mao was not in firm control; instead the factions’ strength waxed and waned.
   2. Mao and the First Five Year Plan
      a. The Soviets agreed to build 156 major industrial projects in China
      b. From the Soviet point of view, construction of this heavy industry would help to create an urban proletariat which would help stabilize the regime.
         (1) The Soviets remembered peasant resistance to Stalin.
      c. Mao insisted that conditions in China were different, and that in China, the peasants were the most revolutionary class.
      d. In fact, according to Vadney, following the bloody purges of the first stages of land reform in the late 1940's (when peasants wiped out the gentry class) the creation of cooperatives in the 1950's had moved forward quickly and with little bloodshed. (171-5)

D. Khrushchev and the beginning of the Rift
   1. Dunbabin writes “In retrospect the Chinese were to say that major disagreements started with Khrushchev’s condemnation of Stalin without prior consultation (in the 1956 Secret Speech), while the Russians saw the Chinese policy later in 1956 of letting ‘a hundred flowers bloom, a hundred schools of thought contend’ as providing the seed-bed for chauvinist, anti-Soviet sentiments.” (432)
      a. Both, taking point of view into account, are correct.
   2. Mao was offended at the attacks on Stalin, whom he defended as a “great if sometimes misguided revolutionary leader.” (Vadney 180)
      a. In the Chinese view, the Soviet Union’s problems in Eastern Europe in the late 1940's and 1950's were due to Soviet hegemony, not Stalin’s crimes—the Soviets treated fellow socialist nations as colonies and dependencies.
      b. In this, the Chinese failed to understand either Stalin or Soviet Communism.
   3. Nuclear Policy
      a. Mao accepted Soviet propaganda on Sputnik and on Soviet production of nuclear
armed rockets “like sausages” at face value.

b. He evidently did not know that Khrushchev was bluffing–the Soviets were not stronger than the West, and that, in the event of an actual showdown, they would lose

(1) This is, of course, why Khrushchev ultimately backs down in the Cuban Missile Crisis

c. Having accepted the proposition that the socialist camp was technologically and numerically superior to the capitalists, Mao saw no reason to be conciliatory.

d. He did not think a hard-line would lead to war, but even if it did, he believed that if “half of mankind died, the other half would remain while imperialism would be razed to the ground and the whole world would become socialist.” (qtd in Dunbabin 433)

(1) Such an attitude towards nuclear war shocked the Soviets.

4. Bones of contention

a. Beijing favored a more hard-line policy on the Middle East (Lebanon)

b. Khrushchev called for a summit that would include India but not China

c. The Soviets had proposed supranational control of their armed forces (which would, like the Warsaw Pact, result in overall Soviet control)

d. Chinese shelling of Matsu and Quemoy, which the Soviets regarded as reckless

e. Khrushchev’s proposal in 1959 that China abandon the goal of annexing Taiwan

f. Khrushchev’s decision not to supply China with a model atomic bomb, as had been promised in 1957

g. China’s model of development, which clashed with the Soviet model (Dunbabin 433-4)

5. The Chinese Point of View

a. Their economy was shaky

b. Taiwan was armed with modern US weapons

c. The US was very hostile and they feared nuclear attack

d. China was isolated from Western markets and extremely dependant upon the Soviet Union for access to modern technology (Spence 556)

6. The Hundred Flowers Campaign

a. “Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend”

b. The underlying issue was over who would control China’s bureaucracy, the Maoists or the Modernizers.

c. Mao called for the intelligentsia to evaluate the First Five Year Plan.

d. The level of criticism took Mao aback, and he called it off.

e. In the meantime, however, he had drawn his critics out into the open in order to destroy them. (Vadney 175-6)

7. The Great Leap Forward (GLF)

a. In 1958, Mao embarked China on the Great Leap Forward “a grandiose scheme for boosting production with cheap decentralized plan (like ‘backyard’ steel furnaces) and for regrouping existing collective farms into ‘communes’.” (Dunbabin 434)

b. Central planning was scaled down, local authorities (Maoists) given more authority

c. Cooperatives were combined into communes.

(1) Vadney notes that since the communes were the result of Maoist cadres at
work, the motivations are more political than economic. (177)

(2) Once again, Communists make actual economic policy out of political considerations, which is one big reason why Communists economies don’t do very well.

d. Thousands of small industrial enterprises formed in the countryside. [I can’t help but think that any attempt to modernize China by small scale, rural-based industry is foolish on the face of it]

e. Since the GLF was labor-intensive rather than capital-intensive, it “thus addressed the hope of most Third World nations that someday they might break their dependency on foreign investment. After all, investors wanted profits for themselves, and took wealth out of the Third World.” (Vadney 178, emphasis added)

f. The Soviet view of the GLF was that it was an attempt was to leap over the “natural stages of socialist construction in the countryside, tested by the experience of other socialist countries.” (Qtd in Dunbabin 434)–in other words, the program was a challenge to Soviet leadership, and it was perceived as such not only in Moscow, but in the capitals of Eastern Europe.

g. The GLF meant reorganization of the entire country side, resulting in chaos.

h. About 20,000,000 people died of hunger as a result of the Great Leap Forward, and Mao was forced to back off.

i. Famine gave strength to the modernizers. In 1959, the Central Committee of the CCP replaced Mao as head of state with Liu Shaoqi

(1) The Maoists declined until the Great Cultural Revolution

E. 1960: The Rift is in the Open

1. The Chinese attacked “peaceful coexistence” in Long Live Leninism

2. In 1960, the Soviets pulled all of their technical advisers out of China (most notably, the advisers in the nuclear program)

3. The two sparred with each other, using Albania and Yugoslavia as proxies

a. The short version of this is that Yugoslav Serbs aspired to annex Albania

b. Khrushchev, who was trying to heal the rift with Yugoslavia, supported Belgrade.

c. The Albanians, who did not wish to be annexed, found Chinese support to be very useful against this pressure. (cf Spence 558)

4. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 brought everything out into the open

F. Chinese border disputes

1. With Tibet in 1959

a. Protests in Tibet resulted in armed rebellion

b. Chinese troops crushed the rebellion, killing many Tibetans, destroying ancient monasteries, and forcing the Dalai Lama to flee to India.

2. With India in 1959

a. A strategic road built through the Kundun Mountains to link Xinjiang to Tibet ran, in fact, through territory claimed by India.

b. Other territorial disputes lay in Bhutan

c. Fighting erupted in 1959

d. Khrushchev refused to support the Chinese and extended generous credits to India. (Spence 555-557)

e. Note the dates: this coincides with other events, such as conflicts over Albania / Yugoslavia and withdrawal of support for China’s nuclear program

3. With Pakistan
1. Settled without fighting because Ayub Khan—certainly no revolutionary—wanted Chinese support against India over Kashmir

4. With the Soviet Union in 1969
   a. The Soviets built up heavy defenses along the Mongolian border in the same general area as had been fought over between Soviets and Japanese.
   b. Actual fighting broke out over Chen pao island in 1969, with the Chinese getting much the worst.

5. With Vietnam in 197*

G. Sino-American Rapprochement
   1. Chinese foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution, under the influence of Lin Biao, was aggressively revolutionary.
   2. Lin insisted that the Third World would surround and strangle the capitalist world.
   3. Lin gave moral support to radicals and revolutionaries around the world, such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization.
   4. Mao’s *Little Red Book* was translated into many languages and widely disseminated.
   5. Reasons for the Shift
      a. In 1971, Chinese diplomacy succeeded in attaining a seat in the UN, supplanting Taiwan
         (1) Most of the world thought it was silly to pretend that the government in Taiwan represented China when the government controlling the mainland, and the largest population on earth, was not recognized.
         (2) The US finally gave up opposition as futile.
      b. Mao was increasingly worried about Soviet military build up on his border and his power struggle with Lin Biao
      c. The “Petroleum Group” within his government, technicians who had suffered under the Cultural Revolution, came back into favor. They understood that China could not develop its petroleum resources as fast as desired without Western (i.e. US) help.

6. Ping Pong Diplomacy 1971
   a. The Chinese signaled their interest in better relations by a surprise invitation to the US table tennis team, then in Japan (they beat us badly, by the way)

7. The Nixon Visit
   a. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger flew secretly (so secretly, Congress and the Secretary of State did not know about it) to confer with Chou En lai
   b. Chinese Americans were allowed to send money to relatives on the mainland, and trade with China allowed
   c. Nixon arrived in 1971 to meet with Mao
      (1) Only a Republican President with a long history of bitter hostility to Communism could have gotten away with such a move.
      (2) Remember how the Republicans had raged that Truman had “lost” China
   d. The joint communiqué issued was very cautious, but marked a basic shift in both nation’s policies. (Spence 595-600) Greater contact, trade, and limited cooperation will result.
   e. The Sino-US rapprochement allows both to benefit vis a vis the Soviet Union.

H. Competition for the allegiance of other communist parties
   1. Vietnam 1979
      a. Historically, the Vietnamese have been extremely wary of Chinese ambitions
      b. Consequently, they looked to the Soviet Union for assistance
c. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979 to overthrow Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge regime led to the Chinese invasion of their common border.
d. The PLA’s mauling of the Vietnamese was a warning.
e. Almost simultaneously with the invasion of Vietnam, the Chinese concluded several large trade deals with the US, Deng Xiaoping visited President Carter, and the US and China announced normalization of relations (with the US severing ties with Taiwan.) (Spence 623-624)

2. Cambodia
   a. The Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot, found Maoist thinking compatible
   b. Note however also, that the Khmer Rouge regarded the Vietnamese as enemies.
   c. Since the Soviets supported Vietnam, the Khmer Rouge turned to China.

3. Cuba
   a. Castro’s policies of fomenting insurrection in Latin America inclined him towards the Chinese in the 1960's
   b. However, the failure of his economy in the 1960's, forced him to toe the Soviet line when the Soviets restricted oil deliveries in 1968 and restricted other aid in 1970.

4. Sendero Luminosa
   a. Groups such as Sendero Luminosa are Maoist inspired, relying upon a peasant based revolution.

5. China could not really compete in aid offerings to Third World countries with the Soviet Union. Their successes at wooing communist movements world wide from the Soviets are limited.

XII. The Strategic Arms
A. NATO and Nuclear Arms from Eisenhower
   1. Eisenhower believed primary responsibility for ground defense of Europe should rest with NATO allies, with US nuclear weapons “available for use as other munitions.” (Dunbabin 153)
      a. Tactical nuclear weapons (TACs) were deployed in 1954 and NATO commanders told to plan to use them.
      b. Force levels were intended to be strong enough to act as a shield against Warsaw Pact attack, rather than a “trip wire” but actually fell somewhere in between.
   2. Kennedy’s NATO policy in practice followed a similar pattern. US force levels in Europe fell from 434,000 in 1962 to 300,000 in 1979 despite Soviet force level build up. (Dunbabin 154-5)
   3. During this period the population of many NATO nations showed alarm at the presence of nuclear weapons (as evidenced by demonstrations, with helpful assistance from the KGB), but the governments of Europe feared being uncoupled from a nuclear strategy, which might make a conventional war seem like a viable option.
   4. So long as any incursion into NATO by the Warsaw Pact (or vice versa) meant nuclear war, any incursion was deterred. (Dunbabin 156)

B. Soviet Nuclear Policy in Europe
   1. Stalin had no direct defense against the bomb except the threat of over running a largely defenseless Western Europe.
      a. Forces increased from 2.9 million men in 1948 to 5.7 million in 1953, plus 1.5 million more from the satellites
   2. The Soviets had their first bomb deployed in 1953, when the US had an estimated 1,600 bombs. (Dunbabin 156)
3. Khrushchev initially reduced forces but reversed the trend with the Berlin crisis in 1961.
4. Spending increased steadily in the 1970s and 1980s.
5. Soviet Doctrine
   a. Doctrine was quite aggressive, including the idea of pre-emptive strikes.
   b. Achievement of nuclear parity in the 1960s led some Soviet thinkers to foresee a conventional option again, provided the Soviets could achieve **escalation dominance**.

C. US Strategic Doctrine [This section is obviously not really complete] (cf Dunbabin 160-188)
   1. The Missile Gap was really an illusion, fostered by sputnik and Khrushchev’s rhetoric. Kennedy discovered when he took office that the US had a heavy lead
      a. **Minute Man** Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (**ICBMs**)  
      b. **Polaris** Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles (**SLBMs**)  
   2. **“Healey’s Theorem” if there is one chance in a hundred that nuclear weapons would be used, that is enough to deter an aggressor**
      a. Think tanks might discuss “acceptable loss” but that does not exist in the real world. The obliteration of even a single city in a nuclear war would be a catastrophic failure for everyone.
      b. Theories of escalation ladder and escalation dominance to the contrary, the only nuclear threshold that really mattered was the first use of any nuclear weapon. (Dunbabin 161-162)
   3. **Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)**
      a. Robert MacNamara of the Kennedy administration understood that so long as the United States had enough defense capability to absorb a first strike from the Soviet Union and still be able to 25% of the population and 50% of the industry, then no rational Soviet leader would ever attack.
      b. Our ability rests upon a **Nuclear Triad**: ICBMs, SLBMs, and long range bombers.
      c. MacNamara understood that MAD must indeed be mutual: we could not seek to achieve the ability to destroy Soviet second strike capability. (Dunbabin 162-164)
   4. **Nuclear Test Ban Treaty** 1963
      a. Khrushchev offered a moratorium on atmospheric testing in 1958 following deep concerns in the world after contamination of some Pacific Islanders and a Japanese fishing vessel after a US test.
      b. The moratorium was broken when Khrushchev heated up his foreign policy in September 1961.
      c. Following the Cuban Missile crisis, US-Soviet atmospheric testing is ended with the Test Ban Treaty.
      d. Testing from henceforth would be underground.
      e. The difficulty in a test ban treaty for underground testing is the need for onsite inspections, which the Soviets for a long time would not allow. (Dunbabin 165-7)
   5. **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty** 1968
      a. Other nations wanted to join the nuclear club, including France and China.
      b. US-Soviet goal was to keep these weapons in safe, that is, existing hands.
      c. Nuclear proliferation is a hot topic as this is written, in 1999. Nations who have or wish to acquire nuclear weapons include.
         (1) Pakistan  
         (2) India  
         (3) Libya
(4) South Africa  
(5) Israel  
(6) Iraq  
(7) North Korea (Dunbabin 167-9)

6. **ABM and SALT I Treaties** 1972  
   a. ABM is Anti Ballistic Missile  
   b. Soviet deployment of an ABM system threatened to upset MAD  
   c. President Nixon ordered development of an ABM while negotiating to ban ABMs.  
   d. The resulting treaties prevented ABM systems and limited the numbers of ICBMs (Dunbabin 169-71)

7. **MIRV**s  
   a. MIRV is Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicles  
   b. MIRVs allow the same number of missiles to carry many more war heads.  
   c. Our deployment of MIRVs complicated SALT I negotiations (Dunbabin 171-4)

8. **SALT II** 1972-9  
   a. Difficult and lengthy negotiations led to an agreement on issues of verification, maximum warheads per missile, testing, and deployment of new missile systems.  
   b. The treaty was blocked in the Senate when Jimmy Carter, in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, withdrew it.  
   c. Both sides ostensibly obeyed the treaty anyway, but by 1986, President Ronald Reagan announced that “direct Soviet non-compliance” --i.e. Soviet cheating—the US would no longer abide by the treaty. (Dunbabin 176-80)

9. **Cruise** and **Pershing Missiles** in Europe 1983 (Dunbabin 181-2)  
10. **Star Wars**, the 1986 **Reykjavik Summit** and the 1987 **INF** Treaty (Dunbabin 183-5)  
11. **START I** and **START II** (Dunbabin 1187-8)
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